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ABSTRACT
Many studies on women’s group-based development interventions raise impor-
tant questions on the heterogeneity of impacts caused by differences in group
functioning, the sustainability and evolution of groups and the characteristics
that differentiate those that are self-reliant and capable of being agents of social
change. This study aims to lay the framework for a multidimensional metric that
is informed by theory and the current role played by women’s groups, determined
by established methodology and validated by data. Three potential indices and
the best weighted index score are identified based on traditional reliability and
validity tests conducted on using cross-sectional group level data from a survey
of 170 SHGs in Odisha, India. The main contribution on the identified index is in
enabling comparisons of SHGs promoted by different SHPIs in different contexts
and thus opens up the possibility of effective consolidation of existing programs
and groups, as is being attempted in countries like India. Given its multidimen-
sional nature, the index developed in this study allows scope for further valida-
tion, refinement and expansion to suit multiple needs.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades, financial inclusion through microfinance has been
at the fore of development policy discussion. Pioneered by the Grameen experi-
ment in Bangladesh in the 1970s, microfinance through group-based joint liability
lending is considered to be one of the most effective ways to address issues of
compliance and collateral in lending to the poor. Grameen model replications and
other modified versions such as bank-linked Self-Help Groups (SHGs) exploded
in a number of countries, especially between 2000 and 2011, when the global lend-
ing portfolio grew at an average compound annual growth rate of 39% from $2.2
billion to $80 billion (Roodman, 2013). By 2013, approximately 211 million bor-
rowers were reached by more than 3700 institutions around the world with both
government and donor as well as commercial funding (Reed et al., 2015). Mi-
crofinance lending has focused primarily on women, who are seen as more equi-
table spenders and responsible borrowers and bear a disproportionate burden of
poverty (Bank, 1990; Khandker, 2005; Kevane and Wydick, 2001). Women of the
urban and rural poor who are empowered by financial access and organized as
joint-liability or mutual solidarity groups, are increasingly being viewed as agents
of social change around the world.
The initial spread of the microfinance movement coincided with academic and
policy debates in the 80s and 90s on the effectiveness of international aid and top
down structural adjustment (Mansuri and Rao, 2004). Social scientists such as
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Chambers, Putnam and Ostrom emphasised the potential of community-led par-
ticipatory development to resolve inefficiencies of markets and Government in the
creation and governance of local goods and public institutions (Chambers, 2014;
Putnam, 1995; Ostrom, 1998). In addition, there was recognition of the need for de-
velopment programs that could eventually function without public or donor sup-
port and funding (Bennett et al., 1996). In an effort to ensure the long term impact
and self-sustainability of financial inclusion, financial intermediation was supple-
mented with social intermediation. To date, microfinance providers in conjunc-
tion with governmental and non-governmental organizations commonly involve
borrowers in skills-training, capacity building and community development pro-
grams. Organizations such as the Self Employment Women’s Association (SEWA)
in India have enabled women borrowers to channel credit into productive invest-
ments and develop financial independence. NGOs like BRAC, CARE, World Vi-
sion, MYRADA and others also provide development assistance in the areas of
health, nutrition, education and gender to affliated women’s groups.
Since its first forays, the impacts of microfinance have been evaluated and re-
evaluated repeatedly, receiving contradictory verdicts and mixed reviews from
academics and practitioners alike. While some studies estimate large positive im-
pacts on physical and human capital (Pitt and Khandker, 1998; Karlan and Zin-
man, 2009; Deininger and Liu, 2009b), others demonstrate little to no impact on
borrowers (Morduch et al., 1998; Roodman and Morduch, 2014; Banerjee, 2013).
Despite improvements in establishing empirical causal relationships through the
use of randomized evaluations, few studies allow for or investigate heterogenous
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program impacts and implementation hurdeles Deininger and Liu (2009b); Ar-
menda´riz and Morduch (2010). Microfinance institutions and development part-
ners often rely on anecdotal evidence and internal audits for their own monitoring
and evaluation rather than systematic and standardised enquiry into successes
and failures. As a result, there is a lack of clarity on the mechanisms of engage-
ment between microfinance institutions and womens groups, group functioning
and sustainability, and the differential impacts they generate.
Although questions have been raised about the effectiveness of microfinance
in alleviating poverty, implementing better management and accountability in mi-
crofinance institutions and developing best practices for creating and managing
women’s groups can strengthen their role in community development (Roodman,
2013). With millions of borrowing groups already present in remote areas across
the world, a network of efficient groups can be leveraged towards the attainment
of developmental goals and service delivery of basic amenities (Casini and Van-
dewalle, 2011; Saha et al., 2015; Leatherman and Dunford, 2010). Increasingly in
countries like India, women are being involved in programs to tackle malnutri-
tion, promote healthcare and sanitation practices, undertake public works and
resolve local domestic and community conflicts. Efforts are also underway to fed-
erate groups in order to encourage self-governance and catalyse paticipatory de-
velopment and collective action.
Building systematic evidence not just around the impacts of group member-
ship and financial access, but also the process of group formation and function-
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ing thus has high policy relevance. However, the multitude of metrics used and
the highy customized nature of evaluations have rendered comparison between
groups from different promoting institutions difficult. Internal evaluations by
microfinance institutions and other group promoting institutions such as NGOs,
donors and Government bodies rank groups on criteria such as credit rating, ad-
ministrative and savings discipline, and participation of members focusing more
on operational efficiency rather than the creation of groups with a potential for
collective action (Isern, 2007; Raja Reddy and Reddy, 2012; Fernandez, 2005; AP-
MAS, 2014). Other studies attempt to identify characterics of successful groups
defining success on a relatively narrow basis of longevity, inclusiveness or repay-
ment of loans (Baland et al., 2015; Bennett et al., 1996; Parida and Sinha, 2010).
The creation and validation of standardised metrics to monitor overall group
functioning would enable organizations to evaluate pre-existing groups across
different promoting institutions and across specific program contexts. Addition-
ally, in light of recent expectations placed on these goups, a definition of SHG suc-
cess that encompasses a multidimensional characterization of group performance
would be more informative than narrow or single indicators that have been used
thus far.
This study attempts to lay the groundwork for the creation of standardised
metrics for womens groups, particularly womens Self-Help Groups (SHGs). The
study draws from insights of theories on organizational behaviour and institution
building, as well as a comparion of different evaluation tools to develop a multi-
4
dimensional framework for the evaluation of SHGs. The study then seeks to for-
malize a multidimensional metric by employing techniques used in poverty mea-
surement and psychometry to create and evaluate an index using cross-sectional
group level data from a survey of 170 SHGs in Odisha, India. It identifies areas
for improvement of the metric and suggests future steps towards its validation.
The following chapter provides an overview of the context and history of mi-
crofinance based group evaluations and also provides the theoretical background
for the multidimensional depiction of SHG performance. Chapter 3 details the
methodology used to create and evaluate the hypothesised relationships within
the multidimensional framework. Chapter 4 provides a brief descriptive profile
of the data and chapter 5 presents the results. Chapter 6 details the further steps
necessary to validate the metric and presents some insights for future research.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
Self-Help Groups (henceforth SHGs) and other membership based civil society
organizations such as cooperatives, unions, risk-sharing groups, producer groups,
resource-management groups, clubs and local governing bodies place communi-
ties in charge of determining their own development trajectory and are thus cen-
tral to the participatory approach to development. The literature review provides
a brief review of the history of SHG based interventions and situates their growth
in popularity within the context of participatory development. By doing so, it
attempts to provide a background for developing a better understanding of the
expectations placed on SHGs and the components of SHG performance. The re-
view concludes with an overview of empirical evaluations of SHGs and similar
organizations and a note on the contribution of the paper to addressing gaps in
evaluation.
The term participatory development has been used to describe the incorpora-
tion of ‘local knowledge and preferences in the decision-making processes of gov-
ernments, private providers and donor agencies ’in development policy (Mansuri
and Rao, 2004). The approach rose to prominence in the late 1980s and 90s as
large-scale top down structural adjustment policies and aid disbursement ori-
ented towards increasing agricultural and industrial productivity proved inef-
fective in tackling poverty and other socio-economic issues in developing coun-
tries. Academic critique has targeted the environmental and social costs of central-
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ized donor-driven policies and emphasized on the strengths of local knowledge
and the benefits of civic engagement in resolving government and market failure
(Chambers, 2014; Cernea, 1985; Escobar, 2011).
The importance of the participatory approach was established in seminal theo-
ries supporting a “people-centric ”or “human ”idea of development such as those
of Schultz, Putnam, Ostrom and Sen. Schultz (1961) and Becker (1962) led early
work in recognizing the effect of accumulation of ‘human capital ’in the form
of skills and knowledge in increasing human productivity. Along with human
capital, ‘social capital ’in the form of social relationships between friends, family
and acquaintances too was recognized as an asset capable of generating returns
(Putnam, 1995; Coleman, 1988; Hanifan, 1916). In the context of development,
these theoretical contributions popularized the idea that non-monetary assets and
social networks can be crucial in mobilizing collective action and enabling pop-
ulations to rise out of poverty (Woolcock and Narayan, 2000). With Sen et al.
(1999) and Nussbaum (2001), poverty came to be viewed as a deprivation of ba-
sic ‘capabilities ’that is not adequately captured by its measurement in terms of
income. The mechanisms of how ‘collective action ’can resolve social dilemmas
and market failure were formalized primarily in the work of Ostrom (1998). Os-
troms theoretical framework and the experimental work of many social scientists
have suggested numerous factors affecting the evolution of group norms and the
role of trust, reciprocity and reputation in the way communities manage com-
mon resources. Following these insights, development programs were reoriented
towards decentralization of planning and accountability by non-governmental
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agencies initially and then by multilateral agencies and donors towards the end
of the 20th century (Brett, 2003).
In the last two decades, The World Bank, UNDP and OECD etc have directed
significant funding to community based initiatives and encouraged governments
and donors around the world to partner with civil society groups (Bank, 2001,
2004). Under the new discourse there has been a widespread adoption of the Hu-
man Development Index, Millennium Development Goals, PLA/PRA method-
ology for development planning, community mobilization efforts especially in
health and nutrition, and other inclusive interventions. Many of these initia-
tives have since borne results. Evaluations have showed the coming together of
communities is associated with improvements in property rights, labor market
outcomes, public investments and financial access (Desai and Joshi, 2014; Bard-
han, 2005; Ostrom and Hess, 2007). Evidence also shows the positive effects of
strengthening in trust and social networks on health, mortality, education and
child welfare (Harper, 2001; Kawachi et al., 1997; Wilkinson et al., 2002; Putnam,
1995; Coleman, 1988; Healy and Coˆte´, 2001). Physical capital in the form of irri-
gation and other infrastructure too has benefited from community participation
(Narayan, 1994; Uphoff and Bruton, 1992). One of the biggest successes of com-
munity involvement has been in the area of financial inclusion.
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2.1 Women’s Self-Help Groups in participatory development
Self Help Groups (SHGs) are typically groups of women who are organized as
borrowing entities in participatory interventions focused on financial inclusion.
They have their origin in the microfinance revolution of the 1980s, a system of
banking pioneered by small and largely non-governmental initiatives, the most
famous of whom is the Grameen Bank in Bangaldesh. Microfinance, understood
broadly as the provision of “small scale financial services ” primarily credit and
savings by formal and sustainable institutions, created a revolution in develop-
ment finance by simultaneously providing a solution to the information asymme-
try problem in banking and strengthening social capital (Robinson, 2001). Microfi-
nance institutions, banks, governments and civil society organizations offer small
loans to groups of women borrowers who are mutually responsible for their re-
payment, thereby creating a system of inter-dependence between individuals and
making use of peer monitoring to minimize the risk of default. This system has
proved to be extremely effective in resolving the problems formal lending insti-
tutions face in 1) ascertaining riskiness of borrowers (adverse selection), 2) ascer-
taining the riskiness of projects to which credit is directed by borrowers (moral
hazard), 3) monitoring returns from these projects (auditing costs) and 4) collect-
ing debt (enforcement) (Ghatak and Guinnane, 1999). For borrowers, the gains
from improved access to liquidity outweigh the costs of the increased risk due to
independence, thus increasing their welfare (Stiglitz, 1990).
SHGs are a particular version of microfinance borrowing groups most popular
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in South and South-East Asia (Brody et al., 2015). Groups are made up of 10-20
women from the same location who are encouraged to engage in regular volun-
tary savings and make interest-bearing loans from the pooled saving to each other
in times of need. SHGs are typically formed or promoted by a governmental or
non-governmental organization but are linked directly to existing financial insti-
tutions for savings and external loans. This framework differs from the Grameen
model in that it does not necessitate the creation of an MFI as a financial interme-
diary, allows considerable autonomy to the group to determine the scope of their
activities and involves relatively less rigid contracts between the different stake-
holders (Baland et al., 2011). The SHG model and the autonomy it offers to women
has become especially relevant after traditional forms of microfinance underwent
a rapid rise and fall in the early 2000s.
Traditional microfinance, which predominantly involved microlending by
MFIs without thrift, initially burgeoned on the heels of the success of the Grameen
bank in maintaining a 98.6 percent repayment rate and in generating substantial
profits (Yunus, 2007). Some similar MFIs like SKS in India and Compartamos in
Brazil were even able to raise capital of their own from initial public offerings
(IPOs) and opened the doors for the inflow of capital and formal banking sector
funds towards under-served populations. The pressure to maintain commercial
viability at scale prompted these institutions to resort to higher and higher in-
terest rates, unethical methods to keep up the repayment levels and compromise
the quality of management (Armenda´riz and Morduch, 2010). Cross-lending by
different lenders buried individual borrowers in debt traps, sparking widespread
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public criticism and government intervention in many parts of the world. Pro-
found skepticism and caution regarding the benefits of microfinance grew among
academics, policymakers and investors leading to the near collapse of the indus-
try in some parts of the world. Despite the rapid rise and fall of microfinance, the
lessons learned prompted a second wave of microfinance that seeks to build on
the strengths of the decentralized group-approach with a focus on capacity build-
ing through finance rather than mere financial access (Robinson, 2001). At the
center of this second wave was the promotion of SHGs and an expansion of their
role to encompass participatory development and enhancement of capabilities of
the poor.
SHGs in their unique position as savings and credit groups with considerable
autonomy in functioning and scope were able to avoid the unsustainability of
rigid institutional governance and narrow lending practices. Especially after the
“microfinance crisis” (Armenda´riz and Morduch, 2010), SHG promoting institu-
tions embraced the poverty reduction approach (terminology used by Robinson
(2001)) i.e the potential for financial access to reduce poverty when combined with
services such as skills training and the delivery of basic amenities, health and ed-
ucation interventions. The SHG model was also envisioned to inculcate aspects of
financial discipline among present-biased individuals (Bauer et al., 2012; Ashraf
et al., 2006; Tanaka et al., 2016; Binswanger, 1980),in documentation, prioritization
of needs and enforcement of terms as groups engage in independent saving and
lending operations with their own earnings (Harper, 2002). Additionally, the peer
monitoring aspect of these groups inherently utilizing and building new social
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capital (Ghatak and Guinnane, 1999; Feigenberg et al., 2010). Groups are eventu-
ally expected to build enough capacity and credibility to be eligible to apply for
loans from formal banks, although they are not mandated to go through all of
these stages if members decide not to do so.
SHGs are in spirit free to determine the scope of their activities outside the
specified common responsibilities, however there are expectations of them from
various stakeholders the State, the Self Help Group Promoting Institution (SHPI),
banks, local government, the community they live in and the members them-
selves. SHGs differ significantly from one another depending on the promoting
institution that governs their formation and development, and can have addi-
tional responsibilities of service delivery, awareness generation and civic activism
in areas such as health, education and gender as encouraged by their promoting
institution. While some institutions (BRAC, BRI) were engaged in these activities
even prior to the 1990s, the past decade has seen a more widespread adoption of
the full breadth of financial services available to mitigate risks and a recognition of
the potential to leverage the social capital within these borrowing groups towards
participatory development.
2.2 SHGs in India
SHGs have a particularly long history and widespread influence in India as com-
pared to the rest of the developing world. The term Self Help Group was first
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made use of by the Reserve Bank of India in 1991 as part of a strategy to encourage
priority sector and rural lending and revive failing public poverty alleviation pro-
grams such the Integrated Rural Development Program (IRDP) (Armenda´riz and
Morduch, 2010; Baland et al., 2008). The strategy, which was governed by the Na-
tional Bank for Rural and Agricultural Development (NABARD) in partnership
with a few NGOs, began with a pilot , linking 500 SHGs to a dozen formal banks in
1992 (Harper, 2002). Groups were soon promoted by a variety of institutions such
as NGOs (such as MYRADA, ENABLE, CARE, PRADAN, BASIX, SEWA), micro-
finance institutions and Non-Banking Financial Companies (NBFCs), and Gov-
ernment Ministries (especially the Ministry of Rural Development and the De-
partment of Women and Child Development ). Government promoted groups in
particular saw a boost in growth after SHGs received policy impetus in the Ninth
(1997-2002) and Tenth Plans (2002-2007) (in Community and Environment, 2008)
upon skepticism regarding the private microfinance industry. A smaller propor-
tion of groups were set up by commercial banks, local civil society organizations
and individuals. With the introduction of country-wide welfare schemes such
as the Swarnajayanti Gram Swarozgar Yojana (SGSY) in 1999 (and the National
Rural Livelihoods Mission in 2014), SHGs also came to be identified as intermedi-
aries and beneficiaries of self-employment and public provision programs. Now
called the SHG Bank Linkage Program (SHG-BLP), the program currently covers
6.6 million women SHGs around the country and around 84 million households
(APMAS, 2014).
Indian SHGs much like other microfinance networks almost exclusively fo-
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cus on women, who are considered to bear a disproportionate burden of poverty
and deprivation (Dreze and Sen, 2002), be more equitable spenders of income
(see Hoddinott and Haddad, 1995) and be more trustworthy borrowers (see Ar-
menda´riz and Morduch, 2010, p 179-195). Among government promoted SHGs,
impetus was also given to the formation of caste-homogenous groups focused on
the inclusion of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and other deprived castes
(Desai and Joshi, 2014). As membership based organizations of the poor with
the potential for collective action, SHGs are increasingly being considered as in-
termediaries in policies aimed at rural poverty reduction, health, education and
womens empowerment (Saha et al., 2015; Leatherman and Dunford, 2010). The
Government of India already involves SHGs towards decentralized delivery and
regulation of crucial public provision programs. Groups interviewed in this study
were involved in preparation of the Take Home Ration for local Anganwadi Cen-
ters (Integrated Child Development Scheme), inspection for quality of Mid-day
Meals served in schools, retailing of LPG cylinders, collection of electricity bill
payments, Forest department public works, cleaning of village common resources
such as wells, tanks and roads, toilet construction and hygiene delivery as part of
the Total Sanitation Campaign, polio immunization drives and Severe Acute Mal-
nutrition (SAM) referrals, anti-alcohol and anti-domestic violence campaigns. In
recent years efforts have been made to federate SHGs in order to encourage self
governance and to give them a stronger poltical voice (APMAS, 2014). In large
scale government programs such as ‘Shakti Varta’ in the context of this study too
bring together SHGs promoted by different organizations to work on common
14
issues.
In reality however, as the Planning Commission of India reports, many SHGs
are not stable and do not last till they can attain maturity or self sustainability,
and income generating activity undertaken by the group often gets fragmented
or exists only on paper (in Community and Environment, 2008). Lahiri-Dutt and
Samanta (2006) caution against excessive reliance on group based approaches by
drawing attention to the evidence of intra-group discordance, lack of communi-
cation and information flow and capture by male family members. Conducting
rigorous evaluations of group behavior and developing improved indicators for
measuring performance can thus inform future program design and governance
of self help groups in development policy.
2.3 Characterizing SHG Performance
The multitude of stakeholders and contexts that determine the groups capacity for
and commitment to community development, make it especially challenging for
researchers to assess the impact and the functionality of Self Help Groups com-
pared to traditional microfinance groups. There is a lack of apparent consensus
on a definition for group success or an indicator of group performance. Most
studies on the effectiveness of SHGs view them solely in the context of microfi-
nance and measure success through financial indicators such as repayment rates
and return on investments (Bennett et al., 1996). However, this does not do justice
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to the gamut of expectations and roles that SHGs have assumed in recent years.
Others that incorporate a wider range of duties in evaluation are often contextu-
alized and not comparable. In order to provide a more complete and comparable
evaluation, it is important to derive standards from collective action that can be
generalized across groups promoted by different institutions and indicate the po-
tential for a group to become an agent of social change in its locality. An attempt
to define a general definition of success across all SHGs comes from literature on
membership based organizations of the poor, a formulation of (Chen et al., 2006).
2.3.1 ‘Membership based organizations of the poor (MBOPs) ’
The term ‘membership based organizations of the poor’, first mentioned in a
conference organized by Cornell University, Women in Informal Employment:
Globalizing and Organizing (WEIGO) and the Self-Employed Women’s Associ-
ation (SEWA) in 2005, tries to distinguish civil society organizations such as SHGs
from the general focus on NGOs. MBOPs as defined by the conference organizers
encompass all civil society organizations “whose governance structures respond
to the needs and aspirations of the poor” (Chen et al., 2006), such as coopera-
tives, trade unions, self help groups and campaigning organizations. Member-
ship based organizations differ from NGOs primarily in their democratic gover-
nance structure, the benefits of which are “internal accountability” to members
and “external legitimacy” in their locality Chen et al. (2006). Further, the defini-
tion of MBOPs requires that the constituent members joined on a voluntary basis
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and have collectively defined their own objectives and decision making structures
(Crowley et al., 2007). An important feature of the groups is their exclusive in-
volvement of the poor, which enabes traditionally weakly organized communities
to represent themselves in interactions with the market and government. MBOPs
thus become crucial stakeholders in participatory development policy.
SHGs due to the autonomy in self-governance and adoption of wider man-
dates accorded to them, adequately lend themselves to definition as ‘membership
based organizations of the poor (MBOPs)’ capable of being recognized indepen-
dently of institutions that form or lend to them (Tiwari and Thakkur, 2007). Such
a definition provides clarity on the nature of organization of SHGs and enables
better evaluation of these groups in terms of both functioning and impact. The
enumeration of indicators of success in MBOP literature (compiled in Chen et al.
(2006)) provides a starting point in developing a theoretical background for the
evaluation of SHGs.
In defining success for all MBOPs in general, Crowley et al. (2007) emphasize
on the achievement of goals and impact as well as functioning. An important
classification is made in Roever et al. (2005) distinguishing expectations placed on
SHGs as pertaining to internal aspects ie in enabling members to attain mutually
agreed upon goals according to mutually agreed norms, and the external aspects
ie in taking an initiative to engage in policy and successfully voicing the views
of the traditionally underrepresented. This classification is useful as it recognizes
both the groups role as an organization composed of individuals as well as the
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wider mandate adopted by these groups and agents of social change.
2.3.2 Dimensions of performance
The various dimensions or components that make up performance are derived
from literature on MBOPs, institutional formation, organizational behavior and
collective action, interpreted in a manner that utilizes and provides insights
specifically on group-level information as per the scope of the study.
Internal
Organizational success in voluntary associations has generally been viewed
in terms of organizational efficiency and accountability, based on factors that are
“internal” to the organization. Roever et al. (2005) identifies the constituents of
internal success to include capacity building and fostering of debate among mem-
bers, and the achievement of stated goals. Achievement of group goals typically
necessitates the adherence to group regulations and norms such as in governance
and financial discipline, internal and external accountability. Other indicators of
success used in studies of microfinance and SHGs, such as the retention or expan-
sion of membership and financial/managerial self reliance (Crowley et al., 2007),
group lifespan (Walker and McCarthy, 2007), representation of minorities (Baland
et al., 2008) also signify “internal” success.
The difficulty in defining common standards of “internal” success in SHGs is
18
Table 2.1: Common Agenda of SHGs
1 SHGs had a name and a recorded membership
2 They changed their leaders regularly
3 Books (minutes of meetings and accounts) were maintained and audited
4 They fostered the habit of saving (by giving up some non-essential consumption expenditure)
and adding the amount weekly to the groups common fund
5 They lent from their savings for at least six months prior to receiving a bank loan;
6 They received adequate institutional capacity-building training and mentoring
7 The common fund of each SHG comprised regular savings, and loans were given regularly (the
amount of interest was used as an indicator); fines were levied for dysfunctional behaviour (this
related to discipline in participating in meetings and in finance management); and evidence of
fines was taken as a positive sign that discipline was given importance
8 They had taken action to foster change to promote better gender relations; they had put a priority
on education, especially of girl children; they had taken action to reduce wasteful expenditure, es-
pecially by their husbands; they had mobilized to promote equity and had lobbied governmental
and Panchayat Raj institutions for better services and more transparent management
Source: (Fernandez, 2005)
challenging as group regulations and norms differ from one Self Help Promot-
ing Institution (SHPI) to another. However, there are some basic responsibilities
undertaken by these groups in most contexts. These are delineated in 2.1 as iden-
tified by MYRADA, an NGO and one of the oldest promoters of SHGs in India.
To further understand the relationship between group regulations and norms
and organizational success, insights from the rational choice and extended behav-
ioral and bounded rationality theories of social institutions built by Ostrom (1998)
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and Calvert (1995) are particularly useful. Despite the distinction Crowley et al.
(2007) make between MBOPs as organizations and institutions, the fundamental
game theoretic solutions that need to arise in any group for it to sustain and en-
gage in the process of collective action remain the same. These include the two
basic requirements of institution building named by Calvert (1995) as cooperation
and coordination. We make use of this distinction to help us identify the set of
potential indicators of “internal” success.
1. Cooperation
Cooperation is said to exist when individuals follow the rules of the game
and abide by mutually agreed norms. For example, SHGs succeed as borrowing
groups only when members are willing to cooperate to adhere to their repayment
schedules and contribute regular savings. In the governance of SHGs, individuals
must relinquish leadership positions in order for there to be rotation and ade-
quate representation in executive roles. Voluntary activities of the SHG, including
those that do provide monetary incentives such as income generating activities
and those that don’t such as public service activities, especially require cooper-
ative behaviour according to Calvert, as members adhere to norms that are not
binding, and a socially defined notion of honor. While Ostrom identifies indica-
tors of cooperation in trust, reciprocity and reputation among individual mem-
bers, group level indicators of success would include member adherence to com-
mon norms such as attendance, participation in activities and decision-making
and awareness among members of group norms and duties.
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2. Coordination
Coordination is said to exist when cooperation between individuals is lever-
aged towards a common goal or action. As Calvert (1995) mentions, even if the
problem of cooperation has been solved, the achievement of group goals requires
coordination between members in order to choose between several desired out-
comes and identify appropriate roles and allocate roles among themselves. This is
unlikely to occur in a group without deliberation, discussion, guidance and prac-
tice. Therefore the role of the SHPI and supporting organizations is also impor-
tant in translating cooperation into deliverable outcomes. The accomplishment
of activities, agreement on outcomes and amicable resolution of conflicts without
attrition would therefore indicate coordination success.
External
Just as internal standards of success can benefit from an understanding of the
dilemmas of social choice, external standards for success are informed by a better
understanding of the outcomes of collective action. An SHG might be considered
successful if it fulfills its role as an MBOP by representing the voice of the under-
privileged in policy (Roever et al., 2005). Nevertheless, the stakeholder credibility
of an SHG is built slowly through engagement with members of the community
and involvement in particular policy initiatives.
1. Engagement Experience
While achieving policy favorability might be a long term indicator of success,
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the potential for collective action is evidenced by group engagament with other
stakeholders in society such as other SHGs, the SHG Federation and the commu-
nity at large. By doing so the group gains external recognition and a stronger
leverage in policy dicussions.
2. Program Specific Experience
Both coordination and external accountability are built through practice and
reputation. Therefore, prior experience in a given policy area makes an SHG more
likey to achieve outcomes in that area.
The theories underlying collective action and social institutions are also ef-
fective in formally understanding some of the underlying determinants of per-
formance in these groups. Group characteristics such as size and heterogeneity,
individual characteristics such as discount rates affect the trust, reciprocity, rep-
utation, and communication potential needed for individuals to work together
. Ostrom (1998) mentions the effect of organizational structure, monitoring and
information availability are other influences.
2.4 History of Impact and Process Evaluations of SHGs
Given the origins of the SHGs in traditional microfinance interventions, empiri-
cal evaluations of microfinance programs and borrowing groups are often used to
make inferences about SHGs and vice versa (for instance in Brody et al. (2015)).
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There are few quantitative and qualitative studies focusing specifically on the
SHG model according to its generally specified definition (refer section 2.1 ). Just
as internal and external dimensions together constitute SHG performance (Roever
et al., 2005), process and impact evaluations of SHGs or microfinance groups are
complementary in facilitating a better understanding of group-based interven-
tions.
While process evaluations concentrate on the implementation and functioning
of an SHG or microfinance program based on the programs theory and planning
(for eg. the reach and composition of groups, the capacity of groups to fulfil its
responsibilities, management of finances within the group, repayment discipline,
investments, participation etc), impact evaluations are concerned with the out-
comes and progress towards goals such (for eg. reduction of poverty, womens
empowerment etc). Program monitoring and process evaluations are extremely
useful in interpreting the results of impact evaluations and are informing future
policy and implementation decisions (Gertler et al., 2011). In the context of self
help group assessments, although impact evaluation studies have overcome sig-
nificant empirical challenges and have informed the policy, contradictory findings
and heterogeneous impacts of programs are not adequately explained by supple-
mentary process studies as yet.
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2.4.1 Impact evaluation
Impact studies of microfinance and womens self help group programs that have
been conducted thus far have differed in empirical strategies used as well as the
results. Earlier studies such as Pitt and Khandker (1998), which showed large
positive impacts on annual consumption expenditure, were criticized for not ad-
equately dealing with selection bias, attrition bias and reverse causality among
other issues (Roodman and Morduch, 2014; Morduch et al., 1998). Armenda´riz
and Morduch (2010) express the reservation that no matter the outcome of in-
terest, it is difficult to separate causal impacts of microfinance exposure as bor-
rowers are systematically different from non-borrowers as demonstrated by Cole-
man (2006); Hashemi (1997). Later studies have attempted to use longitudinal,
experimental or quasi-experimental methods to more rigourously establish rela-
tionships between microfinance and its direct impacts on investment and con-
sumption behaviour. Studies measuring impacts on access to formal credit, de-
pendence on moneylenders, employment, investment and productivity, response
to risk, durable and non-durable consumption expenditure, intrahousehold real-
location and total incomes, are less optimistic about the size of gains from micro-
finance but acknowledge the influence of good policies and implementation (Ka-
boski and Townsend, 2011; Karlan and Zinman, 2009, 2010, 2011; Banerjee et al.,
2015; De Mel et al., 2009; Dupas and Robinson, 2013; Angelucci et al., 2013; Augs-
burg et al., 2012; Anderson and Baland, 2002). The estimates of indirect impacts,
however, on womens bargaining power and mobility (Pitt et al., 2006; Swain and
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Wallentin, 2009; Kandpal et al., 2013), health and nutrition (Rosenberg et al., 2011;
Deininger and Liu, 2009b), social capital and political empowerment (Deininger
and Liu, 2009b; Desai and Joshi, 2014; Pitt et al., 2006) and subjective well being in-
dicators (Kim et al., 2009; Pronyk et al., 2006) are mostly positive. There is a degree
of comparability among both outcome indicators as well as estimation methodol-
ogy that makes it easier to synthesise and conduct meta-analyses (such as Brody
et al., 2015).
2.4.2 Process Evaluation
Process evaluations on the other hand are much more customised to the prac-
titioners needs making comparability across programs difficult. Moreover, only
few studies attempt to estimate the sources of variation in the efficacy of SHG
programs and constituent groups. While interpreting impact evaluation results,
the functionality of groups is assumed to generally abide by economic contract
theory and principal-agent theory (Armenda´riz and Morduch, 2010).
Conventions in monitoring and process evaluation have better developed in
those aspects essential to the goal of financial sustainability. For example, oper-
ational and financial self-sufficiency ratios at the institution-level and credit rat-
ing scores/eligibility criteria at the group level are commonly used in multiple
microfinance programs (Armenda´riz and Morduch, 2010).The aspects that are es-
sential to the goal of poverty reduction and the wider agenda of microfinance are
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more difficult to define and measure. Nevertheless, APMAS CRI+ tool and large
number of NGOs in India have developed their own performance measures that
incorporate financial sustainability as well as other organizational features that
are necessary to fulfil the wider agenda. These summary measures are used pri-
marily to score and/or rank groups to facilitate internal monitoring rather than
explain performance. The indicators used vary from program to program and the
inclusion of indicators is not explicitly justified and perhaps based on experience.
Some development institutes such as the World Bank have provided guidelines
for practitioners on measurement of performance (Krishna and Shrader, 1999).
The indicators most commonly used include member demographics, group com-
position, age and size, administrative performance (such as meeting attendance,
division of responsibilities, participation in decision making and documentation)
and financial performance (such as savings, loans, repayment history and prof-
itability, see Appendix 2).
Further, some studies have attempted to identify the sources of variation
in performance indicators of interest, commonly group lifespan and repayment
rates. In measuring lifespans,Baland et al. (2008) estimate that lower castes and
landless farmers in caste heterogeneous groups are more likely to leave groups, in-
dicating the positive negative effect of group hetergeniety on performance. Like-
lihood of attrition is also higher among members with lower education levels and
when members of the group are not related to other members. Deininger and
Liu (2009a) find that stringent monitoring of groups and high repayment frequen-
cies raise repayment rates. Qualitative and statistical studies also find differences
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between groups promoted by different self help promoting institutions in the con-
text of leadership and collective action (Bharamappanavara et al., 2014), outreach,
financial performance and administrative performance (Bennett et al., 1996).
As the discourse of participatory development strengthens in countries like
India and the self help groups formed over the last two decades mature, there
is a need for standardised performance measures that can fulfil the requirements
of new policies involving self help groups. Standardised and easy to measure
performance metrics will enable Governments and development practitioners to
evaluate groups promoted by different institutions in a comparable manner, iden-
tify groups best suited to function as intermediaries or policy stakeholders and
better utilize their strengths.By supplementing information from impact evalua-
tion studies, these metrics can also provide insight into the success and failure of
SHG programs and address some of the questions raised regarding the suitabil-
ity and sustainability of these groups under different contexts. In this paper, I
attempt to develop a performance metric for womens self help groups based on
theoretical background from literature on collective action and group behaviour,
best practices from practitioner evaluation tools and empirical relationships from
a survey of 170 SHGs from Odisha, India.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY
3.1 Study Context
The survey sample of groups in this pilot study was chosen from the beneficiary
SHGs of a flagship development initiative of the State Government of Odisha,
funded by DFID (UK), under the Odisha Health and Nutrition Sector Program.
Odisha, a hilly and forested state on Indias east coast, is one of 3 worst perform-
ing states in India in terms of child mortality including under-5 mortality, infant
mortality and neo-natal mortality rates, despite experiencing a remarkable decline
in these rates from 1990 (UNICEF, 2011). Maternal mortality rates are among the
highest in India and lack of nutritious food, adequate physical rest and social stig-
mas have been attributed as the biggest impediments to development (Planning
Commission, 2012).
The State Governments initiative named Shakti Varta (translated both as
‘women’s voice’ and ‘powerful voice’) is an intervention targeted at facilitating
community processes through a tested Participatory Learning and Action frame-
work Tripathy et al. (2010) towards improving maternal and child health among
the rural and predominantly tribal population. Launched in April 2013, the pro-
gram covers 15 high burden districts in the state (Thomas et al., 2015). A database
of SHGs from Mission Shakti (the state governments program for SHG gover-
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nance) was utilized to generate critical interest in the program. Additionally,
funds flow for implementation was directed through the decentralized SHG fed-
eration network. A real-time Management Information System (MIS) recorded
SHGs who attended program sessions. These databases of SHGs provided the
starting point for the sample used in the study.
3.2 Data Collection
3.2.1 Sampling
The sample was chosen in purposive random fashion from six districts - 3 pilot
districts of Shakti Varta and 3 randomly chosen districts out of the remaining 12
high burden districts in Odisha. According to program officials, the process for
choosing 3 districts as pilot districts too was random. In each district, 4 blocks
and 3 GPs from each block were chosen randomly for the study. In the first round
of surveys 1 Government-promoted group and 1 NGO-promoted group who had
participated in Shakti Varta meetings were targeted from each GP. In addition, an-
other SHG who had not participated in Shakti Varta meetings was targeted in each
GP of the 3 pilot districts to facilitate a comparison between participants and non-
participants for a separate program functioning study provided to Shakti Varta
program officials. For this study however, we pool the entire sample of 170 SHGs
(eliminating refusals) over 6 districts as described in Table 1. There were many in-
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consistencies in the database maintained by the Government preventing us from
getting an even split of Government-promoted and NGO-promoted groups. The
final sample consisted of 64% Government-promoted groups, 29% NGO/MFI-
promoted groups, 6% groups with both Government and NGO promoters and
1 group did not report their Self-Help Promoting Institution (SHPI). All groups
were formed primarily as savings groups.
Table 3.1: SHG Sample by location
District Blocks
covered
GPs
covered
Govt-
promoted
SHGs
Non-
Govt-
promoted
SHGs
Both Did not
report
Total
SHGs
covered
No. No. No. No. No. No. No.
Bolangir 4 12 19 12 2 2 35
Kalahandi 4 12 19 4 1 0 24
Kandhamal 4 11 23 6 1 1 31
Keonjhar 4 11 8 9 5 0 22
Koraput 4 12 18 6 0 0 24
Rayagada 4 12 20 12 2 0 34
Total 24 70 107 49 11 3 170
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3.2.2 Survey Process
A focus group survey for SHGs was designed based on prior evaluations con-
ducted by Shakti Varta staff to capitalize on familiarity and these were supple-
mented with questions from other SHG evaluation tools and questionnaires avail-
able in the public domain. The survey was developed with the purpose of con-
ducting multiple analyses on SHGs and the effective of SHG performance on
program outcomes. Sections in the survey included Group Constitution, Organi-
zational Systems and Discipline, Financial Management and Performance, Goals
and Objectives, Training and Objectives, Social Activities and Services, aside from
questions on participation in Shakti Varta and self-reported changes since becom-
ing a member (see Appendix 6). The survey tool was translated to the local lan-
guage Odiya in which surveys were conducted. Enumerators and program staff of
Shakti Varta were familiarized with the tool in a joint training session held in Bhub-
haneswar, Odisha. The survey was administered by enumerators over 3 weeks in
July 2015, to the sample. A minimum of three members of an SHG, including
an executive member such as the President, Secretary or Treasurer who had ac-
cess to the books and sufficient knowledge of group practices were required to
be present. The information gained from group surveys were supplemented with
focus group discussions with SHG Federation members at the Block Level and
District level government officials, as well as surveys of Anganwadi/ICDS workers
involved in the promotion of women and child nutrition in rural areas. Summary
statistics of measured variables profiling groups in the sample are compiled in
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Appendix 2 and detailed in the following chapter. Wherever possible, surveyors
made attempts to inspect documentation maintained by the group, however most
of the information was self-reported.
3.3 Empirical Methodology
3.3.1 Multidimensionality of SHG performance
A representation of group performance given the characterization in Roever
Roever et al. (2005) must include internal aspects of group functioning, adher-
ence to norms as well as external aspects of engagement with development pol-
icy in order to completely represent the role played by SHGs in participatory de-
velopment. Internal aspects of performance can be further understood as being
comprised of cooperation between members according rules and regulations and
coordination towards goals and activities. All of these aspects can vary greatly
from one context to another Chen et al. (2006), depending on the norms and con-
ventions laid out by the Self Help Promoting Institution, the goals of the members
themselves and the enabling environment or incentive structure under which the
SHG operates. Given the multiplicity of aspects of performance and the diver-
sity of expected outcomes, the measurement of SHG success cannot therefore be
captured by a single indicator.
Methodologically, a dimension represents the “highest hierarchical level of
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analysis and indicates the scope of objectives, individual indicators and variables
”Munda and Nardo (2009). A multidimensional representation allows researchers
to better portray abstract concepts by assimilating the insights provided by mul-
tiple components of the concept and its underlying indicators. Theoretical con-
structs in social development that exhibit similar complexity of definition - such
as social capital and poverty - have been recognized for the challenge they pose
for measurement due the number of indicators that embody them Narayan and
Cassidy (2001); Paldam (2000); Foa and Tanner (2012); Alkire and Foster (2011).
In empirical research, researchers have developed interpretable metrics by un-
packing the definitions of these concepts and identifying the most representative
manifestations of each dimension that constitutes them. For example, the mea-
surement of poverty has embraced evolving definitions of the expectations from
human life, drawing on the background of ‘human development’, ‘capabilities
approach’, the millennium development goals and extensive evidence Alkire and
Foster (2011). Newer and more “direct” poverty measures (such as Morris PQLI,
Sens HDI, Alkire Fosters MDPI) are designed to capture “deprivations of different
kinds” Sen (1993), such as health, education and standard of living which are not
adequately represented by “indirect” indicators such as income . Social capital too
has found consistent representation as a multidimensional concept in the World
Values Survey, Barometer of Social Capital and Global Social Capital Survey and
Social Capital Integrated Questionnaire Narayan and Cassidy (2001), incorporat-
ing questions and games on trust, reciprocity, memberships and engagement with
networks and civil society.
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In SHG group performance, credit ratings, repayment rates and expanded ver-
sions of credit ratings have been used as an “indirect” measure of group perfor-
mance by researchers studying determinants of performance. The accuracy of
performance measurement can be improved by incorporating additional and the-
oretically and empirically informed indicators that provide a more complete rep-
resentation of group performance. In this study, we attempt to measure SHG per-
formance using a multidimensional framework based on a groups ‘internal’ and
‘external’ aspects of performance, and further the evidence of ‘cooperation’ and
‘coordination’ within the group. A greater emphasis has been placed on develop-
ing insights regarding ‘internal’ aspects of group performance, enriching existing
group level predominantly credit rating metrics and taking the first steps in for-
malizing process evaluations for group based interventions such as the formation
of SHGs.
3.3.2 Composite indices in Social Development
Indexing is a particularly useful way of measuring and representing complex phe-
nomenon Hawken and Munck (2013) as they serve to summarize the information
provided by multiple indicators. Through data reduction, indices offer substantial
ease of interpretation Foa and Tanner (2012) and comparability. Due to their prac-
tical application, they have become increasingly important in the social sciences
among academics, policy and research organizations and development practition-
ers alike. Composite indices now abound in the areas of poverty and human de-
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velopment, equality, gender and governance. For example, recent years have seen
the adoption and popular use of the Human Development Index, the Gender De-
velopment Index, Gender Empowerment Measure, Social Institutions and Gen-
der Index, the Worldwide Governance Indicators and the Ease of Doing Business
Index and a host of other measures. An index however, only provides a useful
representation when its construction has a sound theoretical basis and complies
with methodological criteria. Failing this, an index has the potential to mislead
or misinform users and does not solve the problem of multiplicity of indicators
Saltelli (2007).
This study follows steps advised by Foa and Tanner (2012); Munck and
Verkuilen (2002) towards the creation of a representative additive index of the
SHG group performance. The multidimensional treatment of the index borrows
from the Count Method of Alkire Foster Alkire and Foster (2011) which has been
used in the creation of a multidimensional poverty index (MDPI) but is applicable
to a wide range of concepts and indicators that are predominantly of an ordinal
or categorical nature. In the formulation of Alkire and Foster Alkire and Foster
(2011), the index value I is not a summation of the weighted values of the indi-
cators themselves, rather a ”count” of the indicators in a manner than renders
within-dimension and between-dimension possible. The suggested SHG perfor-
mance index borrows from the Alkire-Foster approach for index creation but dif-
fers from the Multidimensional Poverty Index or the Women’s Empowerment in
Agriculture Index (also created with the same methodology) in some ways.
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• The SHG index employs a “positive” scoring and is designed to measure
achievements, rather than deprivations
• The index is a “dual-cutoff” method since it defines cutoffs for indicators
as well as for each dimensions. However, since there is less of a need to
generate a headcount ratio for a given SHG population, an overall cutoff to
measure the aggregate incidence of performance has not been attempted in
this study.
In this sense, the SHG performance index generates an additive scale measure of
performance but employs the multidimensional approach to defining indicators
and analysis scores as employed in Alkire-Foster.
3.3.3 Empirical strategy and Nomological Network
The “system of interlocking laws” that describes the multidimensional nature of
SHG performance is referred to as its nomological network Cronbach and Meehl
(1955). In order to establish that a set of observable indicators or an index ade-
quately measure the abstract theoretical construct it seeks to measure, the nomo-
logical network surrounding the construct must exist. The empirical strategy fol-
lowed seeks to identify and detail the nomological network by relating theoretical
constructs to observable indicators, theoretical constructs to one another and ob-
servable indicators to one another.
36
With the objective of identifying the net, we first identify relevant indicators by
comparing existing tools, theory and empirical relationships between variables.
We then shortlist a set of indicators available in the data that are most suitable for
index construction. A total score is computed for all SHGs in the analysis and then
proceed to analyse the differences and determinants of the total score. In keeping
with the logic of construct validity, the nomological net and indicators is modified
to develop the simplest net that captures the relationships between dimensions
and indicators.
The various steps in the analysis are detailed below.
Level of Analysis
Throughout the analysis, the focus and unit of analysis remains at the group level
This was done so because of the ease of data collection for implementers working
with groups and who are already used to collecting and monitoring group level
indicators. Additionally, a group level picture serves well when supplemented
with individual and household surveys designed to measure impact and member
characteristics.
Selection of Indicators
The conceptual background for measuring SHG performance is visualized in the
manner of Munck and Verkuilen (2002) in 3.1 . The concept of SHG performance
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is shown as being composed of internal and external components. The internal
components are in turn comprised of the dimensions of cooperation and coor-
dination, with the cooperation dimension functioning as catch-all terms for cat-
egories of evaluation found in tools reviewed. To provide a complete picture of
the dimensions of cooperation, coordination and external engagement, care was
taken to adequately represent the interpretations of different tools of the attributes
within each dimension. For example, the ‘cooperation’ dimension incorporation
indicators pertaining to organizational discipline (Sa-Dhan), organizational cul-
ture (World Bank) and systems and self-discipline (CRI).
The selection of the indicators for the tool is thus based on:
1. Theoretical relevance: The components and relationships that comprise
group performance are derived from theories of collective action, institu-
tions and organizational behavior as detailed in section (). Insights from
evaluation guidelines of implementers and independent reports have also
been used to identify the logic of evaluation.
2. Use in prior evaluations: The indicators and characteristics measured in the
survey are based upon a comparison of internal evaluation tools used by mi-
crofinance institutions (eg. BASIX), NGOs (eg. MYRADA), regulatory bod-
ies (eg. NABARD and APMAS) and international organizations (eg. World
Bank). The corresponding tools from which indicators were derived from
are also detailed in Appendix 1
3. Data availability: The tool is developed from indicators measured in a sur-
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vey of 170 SHGs in Odisha, India, in 2015. Although the survey was de-
signed in order to develop an evaluation of SHGs within a specific program
context, the tool was not specifically designed to serve as the basis for a
standardized tool for the evaluation of group performance as defined in this
study. Hence the tool is constrained by the availability of indicators mea-
sured in the 2015 survey.
4. Ease of measurement and minimization of errors: The unit of analysis,
methodology and survey tool was designed keeping in mind the ease of ap-
plication under diverse contexts. Group level information not only provides
crucial insight into the functioning of the programs organizational structure
and regulations, but is also easier to gather data on as compared to house-
hold surveys. From the experience of Shakti Varta programme in Odisha,
India, which was the setting for the survey conducted, group level studies
are also easily integrable into MIS and routine monitoring and evaluation
systems, thus ensuring availability of data are more frequent intervals. From
fieldwork experience, care has also been taken to include variables for which
there is a lower probability of self-report bias and for which information is
verifiable or of an objective nature.
5. Data distribution: Indicators that did not show a sizeable variance and were
highly skewed Babbie (2015) were not considered for the tool.
39
Figure 3.1: Conceptual Framework for Multidimensional Metric of SHG Perfor-
mance
Indicator shortlist and dichotomization
The entire list of indicators measured in the survey to provide a complete profile
of SHGs in the sample is detailed in Appendix 2. Of these, select indicators of
performance based on these criteria are presented in Appendix 1. The indicators
shortlisted and their dichotomous forms include:
Internal
1. Cooperation
• Members are aware of group norms (Awareness, cp1): Higher awareness of
group norms among members increases the likelihood of more equi-
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table and participatory governance of group activities. The indicator is
the response to a question posed on the proportion of members aware
of group norms, coded as a 3 level ordinal scale of 50 percent and below,
50-80% and above 80%. The dichotomous form distinguishes groups
with more than 80% awareness.
• Members participate actively in SHG decision-making and activities(Participation,
cp2): Higher participation in decision-making and activities indicates
the absence of elite capture or dominance. The indicator is the response
to a question on the proportion of members who participate actively,
coded as a 3 level ordinal scale of 50 percent and below, 50-80% and
above 80%. The dichotomous form distinguishes groups with more
than 80% participation.
• Attendance in the last two meetings (Attendane, cp3): Attendance rates in
the last two meetings caputres the current level of involvement of mem-
bers and their adherence to one of their most basic responsibilities as
members. The indicator is the response to a question posed on the pro-
portion of members who attended the last two meetings, coded as a 3
level ordinal scale of 50 percent and below, 50-80% and above 80% for
each meeting.The dichotomous form distinguishes groups with more
than 80% participation.
• Members meet on a regular basis (Meeting reg, cp4): Meeting regularity
is mandated by most SHPIs. The indicator is the 4 level ordinal scale
response to a question on how regularly the group conducts meetings,
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ranging from highly irregular to highly regular. The dichotomous form
distinguishes both regular and highly regular groups from the rest.
• Documentation maintained up to date (Documentation reg, cp5): Although
most SHGs are required to maintain multiple documents of various ac-
tivities, for the sake of comparability across different SHPIs and gov-
erning rules, only maintenance of the savings ledger is assessed for this
indicator. It is dichotomous and records success under 3 conditions -
savings ledger is recorded, it is up to date and it does not have errors
or missing information.
• Has not defaulted on loans (No overdue loan, cp6): This indicator is dichoto-
mous and records success if the group does not report a single overdue
loan. It is one of the most widely used indicators of group performance
although liable to under-reporting.
• Members save on a regular basis (Savings reg, cp7): Similar to meeting reg-
ularity, this indicator is the 4 level ordinal scale response to a question
on how regularly the group collects savings, ranging from highly ir-
regular to highly regular. The dichotomous form distinguishes both
regular and highly regular groups from the rest.
• Leadership change since formation (Leader rotation,cp8): Not all SHGs are
mandated to periodically select members to the executive body, but
most are encouraged to, as a way to keep other members engaged. This
indicator is a dicrete measure of the number of changes in leadership
and its dichotomous form indicates groups with atleast one change.
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• Members access SHG documents for use or verification (Member doc sccess,
cp9): This indicator is the dichotomous response to the question on if
members access group documents. The response implicitly captures
both existence of access to documents or transparency, as well as in-
volvement of members.
2. Coordination
• Activities undertaken (No. of activities, cr1): An effective group is one
that is able to mobilise its members to undertake activities outside of
its financial responsibility. Groups were asked whether or not they had
participated in a list of 12 kinds of activities compiled from a synthesis
of prior surveys and tools. The indicator is measured as a discrete sum
of binary responses to the 12 kinds of activities and hence ranges from
0-12. No attempt was made to differentiate or classify activities. The
dichotomous form differentiates groups who have undertaken higher
than average number of activities , i.e higher than 4 activities.
• Motivated to undertake activity on own accord (Self-motivated, cr2): Groups
were also asked who the primary motivator was for each of the under-
taken activities. The indicator is measured as the discrete sum of binary
responses to the 12 kinds of activities if the group undertook the activity
out of their own accord. The dichotomous form differentiates groups
that have undertaken at least a single activity of their own accord.
• Dropouts from the group (No dropouts, cr3): Dropouts refer to members
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who were part of the group and have subsequently quit the group
due to various reasons. The indicator captures the discrete number
of dropouts from the group since formation, and captures groups that
have 1 or more dropouts in its dichotomous form.
• Total value of group savings (Total savings, cr4): Accumulated savings is
an indicator of the financial discipline maintained by the group and
is a widely used indicator of group performance. The indicator is a
continuous variable capturing the total savings of the group at the time
of the survey. In its dichotomous form it differentiates groups having a
higher than average savings amount of Rs 35052.
External
1. General engagement
• Revived another SHG (SHG engagement, ge1): The group’s experience in
reviving other SHGs simultatneously indicates that the group has met
certain standards set by the SHPI and that the group has experience
in interacting and identifying with other women and group dynamics.
The indicator is a dichotomous response to whether or not the SHG
possesses experience in reviving groups.
• Organized community around common issue (Community engagement, ge2):
This indicator is the dichotomous response to the question on whether
the group has experience mobilizing the common around a common
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cause such as alcoholism, domestic abuse or towards conflict resolu-
tion.
• Actively involved with SHG Federation (Fed engagement, ge3): SHGs are el-
igible for benefits and opportunities when they register with the block
SHG federation, however many are registered by way of procedure but
are not actively involved in federation activities. The indicator is the di-
chotomous response variable that records groups who have registered
with Federations and have either received funds or training from them.
Validity and reliability tests
The appropriateness of a score is determined by its validity, or the ability of the
score to measure what it intends to measure and its reliability, or the ability of the
score to be consistent and replicable. An assessment of validity and reliability can
be performed in a number of ways. Owing to the nature of this study which is
a cross-sectional study with no comparable estimates, only preliminary validity
and reliability checks can be performed on the data collected. The checks are con-
ducted primarily on the ‘internal aspect of group performance to assess the valid-
ity of representation of its underlying variables. The ‘external indicators of group
performance are expected to display weaker relationships with another owing to
the normative nature of this aspect and its multiple exogenous determinants.
I. Validity
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The extent to which an aggregated score represents the theoretical constructs
upon which it is based is referred to as validity (Furr and Bacharach, 2013). The
definition of validity encompasses its many types, including content validity, con-
struct validity and criterion validity. . A brief explanations of these forms and the
tests used to assess them in this study are detailed below.
1. Convergent and divergent validity: Validity of a measure is assessed by exam-
ining whether the operational relationships of component indicators “con-
verge” and “diverge” as they are theoretically expected to. In particular,
we test whether indicators that are hypothesised to measure the same con-
cept are positively associated with one another and those measuring differ-
ent concepts are not associated with one another. The relationship between
the various indicators in the multidimensional metric of SHG group per-
formance are assessed through an analysis of their correlation coefficients.
Appropriate tetrachoric, polychoric and polyserial coefficients are used de-
pending on the nature of the indicator.
2. Construct validity: A measure of the degree to which indicators relate to one
another within an expected system of theoretical relationships is broadly
defined as construct validity. Factor analysis is the most widely used multi-
variate analysis technique to measure construct validity. Exploratory Factor
Analysis (EFA) was performed using the computed polychoric correlations,
which are found by Jo¨reskog and So¨rbom (1996) to be the most consistent
and robust estimators for ordinal and categorical data. Confirmatory factor
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analysis (CFA) is carried out through structural equation modelling to test
the particular hypothesis that the ‘cooperation’ dimension consists of two
different aspects relating to participation and administration.
3. Criterion/Concurrent validity: Measures are additionally validated by the
checking them against a specified criterion - either other simultaneously
measured outcome variables (“concurrent validity”) or future outcomes
(“predictive validity”). Cross-tabulation, Spearman correlation and appro-
priate comparison of means tests (Mann-Whitney (Wilcoxon Rank Sum) and
Kruskal-Wallis) were used to test relationships between the aggregated in-
dex and concurrently measure outcome variables. Predictive validity lies
outside the scope of this study.
II. Reliability
True score theory requires a score to be one that is both consistent as well as
repeatable (Lord et al., 1968). Reliability tests used most often in psychometric
scores encompass both tests of internal or inter-item consistency as well as inter-
observer and test-retest repeatability of an index or scale. The scope of this study
only allows for preliminary internal consistency tests to be performed.
• Internal consistency: A measure of internal consistency tests the extent to
which indicators measure a common concept. Cronbach’s α is a function of
the average covariance among all possible combinations of indicators and
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Table 3.2: Summary of Validity and Reliability Tests Used
Type of Validity or Reliability Test Procedure Used
1 Convergent and Discriminant Validity Polychoric correlations
2 Construct Validity Polychoric Exploratory Factor Analysis
3 Criterion/Concurrent Validity Non-parametric comparison of means and correlations
4 Internal Consistency Kuder-Richardson 20
ranges from 0 to 1. The Kuder-Richardson 20 formula is the particular appli-
cation of coefficient α to dichotomous variables. It is calculated as follows:
KR20 =
( N
N − 1
) (
1 −
∑
piqi
S 2x
)
(3.1)
where N is the number of indicators measuring the same concept, pi is
the proportion of positive responses to the dichotomous indicator i with
i = 1, 2, . . . ,N. qi is the proportion of negative responses equal to 1 − pi,
and S 2x is the variance of the total composite.
A table of tests applicable and the empirical methods used can be found in
Table (3.2).
Identification methodology
Composite indicators can typically be represented in the form of (1.1) as a lin-
ear weighted aggregation of a set of variables that are usually scale-adjusted (al-
48
though other aggregation rules exist, see Munda and Nardo (2009)).
I =
N∑
1
wixi (3.2)
where xi is a scale adjusted variable normalized between zero and one and wi the
weight attached to xi, usually with
∑N
1 wi = 1, 0 <= wi <= 1 and i = 1, 2, ...,N.
In the Count Method of Alkire and Foster (2011), the weighted aggregation for
I is based on a matrix of 1s and 0s representing the achievement or deprivation in
chosen outcome indicators yi for individual i.
Let the matrix y = [yi j] denote the n× 12 matrix of “achievements”, where each
element yi j represents the achievement of SHG i in indicator j, i = 1, 2, . . . , n and
j = 1, 2, . . . , 12. Let z = z j be a 12 × 1 vector of cutoff values for each indicator. The
Alkire-Foster method suggests the use of a general permissible transformation
(Stevens, 1946) of the achievement and cutoff vectors for individual i, in the form
ρ :R×R→ {0, 1} that creates an binary variable ρ(yi, j) = 1 if individual i meets the
cutoff criteria z j, for example yi j > z j, and ρ(yi, j) = 0 if not. Let the identification
transformation be summarized in the binary score matrix g = [gi j] where gi j =
ρ(yi, j). Using a relative weight vector w j > 0 such that sum12j=1w j = 1, we thereby
obtain the total weighted score vector
Iw = [ci] (3.3)
where,
ci =
12∑
j=1
w jgi j (3.4)
49
For comparison a raw unweighted score vector
Iw = [c0i ] (3.5)
is presented, where,
c0i =
12∑
j=1
gi j (3.6)
Similarly an n× 3 “dimensional achievement” matrix y0 = [y0id] can be obtained
from the indicator binary scores gi j such that y0id =
∑k
j=1 gi j, where i = 1, 2, . . . , n , j =
1, 2, . . . , k and d = 1, . . . , 3 represent a dimension made out of k indicators. Using a
1×3 dimensional cutoff vector z0, we can identify ‘dimensional non-performance’
using the identification transformation ρ0, where ρ(yi, j) = 1 if yi j < z j and vice
versa. Further, we can define a 1 × 3 “dimensional binary score” matrix g0 = [g0id]
and
I0 = [c0i ] (3.7)
where,
c0i =
3∑
d=1
gid (3.8)
such that I0 thus gives the total number of ‘dimensions of non-performance’, or
the number of dimensions where the group has not performed up to the mark.
Regression analysis
The study goes a step further to analyse the weighted index I for further detail in
the broad dimensions included in the index. With specific respect to the ‘coopera-
tion’ dimension, exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis is performed on the
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indicators to identify underlying latent factors that correspond to general survey
sections. Additionally, a logistic analysis is conducted on the unweighted index
scores to identify relationships between group performance and the determinants
of performance suggested in prior literature (see Appendix B for literature refer-
enced).
The relationship between the various scores and hypothesised determinants is
formalised as follows:
ln(Θ j) = α j + β1S i + β2Ci + β3Ai + i (3.9)
where the respective log odds ratios are expressed as a linear function of the vec-
tor of institutional structure variables S i, the vector of composition and cohesion
variables Ci and agency variables Ai. The list of these variables is provides in
Appendix A.
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CHAPTER 4
DATA
4.1 Descriptive profile of sample Self Help Groups
A descriptive profile of the sample was built through questions relating to institu-
tional structure, composition, agency and goals and constraints in the survey (see
Appendix 6 for the survey tool from which the profile is drawn). A total of 170
SHGs were surveyed (although the final index score is computed for only 147 out
of 170 SHGs).
4.1.1 Institutional Structure
Self Help Group Promotion Most of the groups in the sample (63%) were
Government-promoted groups formed either as a result of efforts of the villages
Anganwadi worker the primary frontline worker in the Governments Integrated
Child Development Scheme, or officials of the Mission Shakti program under
the Governments Department of Women and Child Development. A handful
of Government-promoted groups were formed under the Odisha Tribal Empow-
erment and Livelihoods Programme under the Scheduled Castes and Schedules
Tribes Development Department. Out of 49 groups promoted by NGOs, 9 groups
reported the involvement of an MFI. Government-promoted SHGs and SHGs pro-
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moted by other NGOs are linked directly to national public or private banks. Only
in 11 groups (7% of observations) did members respond as taking primary initia-
tive for the groups formation. 25 groups reported as having been promoted by
more than one institution.
Figure 4.1: Self Help Promoting Institution
Overall, for the purpose of evaluation, groups were classified into exclu-
sively government promoted SHGs (64.5% of the sample) and groups with non-
governmental and other institutions as at least one of its promoters (35.5%).
Monitoring and evaluation SHPIs incentivize groups in a number of ways. 62%
of groups had been graded for performance and 80% had their books regularly
inspect by the SHPI. However only 11% claimed that their SHPI motivated them
to undertake any activity outside of savings and credit, and 50% of the groups
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said they were constrained by the lack of support and guidance from their SHPI.
A composite ordinal indicator for monitoring level was created as an additive
score of the binary variables indicating grading, inspection of books, motivation
to undertake activity and adequate support and guidance, thereby ranging from
0-4. The distribution of monitoring scores is in 4.2.
Figure 4.2: Self Help Promoting Institution
4.1.2 Composition
Member demographics A brief section in the survey recorded the demographic
make-up of the sample and the groups. The mean age of all reporting 1855 mem-
bers is 39.79 years wth ages ranging from 19 to 55. 72% of the groups had members
below the age of 30. 44% of members who provided their caste background were
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from Scheduled Tribes, whereas 33% were OBC and 20% SC. An extremely high
74% of the sample claimed to have received primary or no education, higher than
the 62% estimated over all districts (including high burden districts from which
the study sample was drawn, as well as non-high burden districts) of Odisha by
the National Sample Survey 66th Round in 2009-10. Only 1% had received tertiary
education at the college level. 52% percent of the group depended on agriculture
as their primary occupation and 29% were engaged as wage-labour. Despite the
fact that SHGs often encourage their members to undertake entrepreneurial in-
vestments, only 6% of members mentioned self-employment/business as their
primary occupation, indicating perhaps that opportunities arising from SHGs are
used generally as supplementary income.
Figure 4.3: Education Level of President
For the analysis, the education level of president and presence of members
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below the age of 30 were chosen to represent differences in education level and
age. Additionally standardized mean education level and mean age of individuals
was also used as a robustness check.
Group composition Among the groups, 61% were single-caste groups. Of these
nearly half were exclusively Schedule Tribe (ST) groups and only 2 were exclu-
sively general or forward caste groups. 28% had at least 2 castes making up the
group and 10% had three or more castes. In caste-heterogenous groups, OBC
dominated groups tended to be more common. Only in 10 groups did no caste
group form a majority. In all but 11 groups, the president of the SHG was from the
dominating caste, in all but 16, the sectary was from the dominating caste and in
all but 3 for the post of treasurer. In the tightly knit village communities of India,
groups also involve other family members who tend to live in the same locality. In
the reporting sample, 72% had members who were related to one another. It did
not appear as though executive members were any more likely to have a kin in the
group to increase their influence. Executive members were not significantly dif-
ferent from other members in terms of age or occupation. However, they tended
to better educated, perhaps in order to carry out procedural tasks and interactions
with the SHPI and banks.
Lifespan and size The average age of groups at the time of the survey was 9.5
years (Table A.2). 134 SHGs (80%) are mature or above the age of 5, according
to NABARD classifications (NABARD 2014) and are expected to be fairly inde-
pendent and involved in all aspects of empowerment. A third of the groups were
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formed in the years 2004-2006, the most active years in SHG formation in the Tenth
Plan of the Indian Government (2002-2007) (Fig 4.4). Despite being in existence
for a long time, only 9 groups reported as being dormant for more than a year
without conducting meetings, collecting savings or engaging with the Self-Help
Promoting Institution altogether. While the general convention followed by most
SHG-promoters in India is to ensure groups have between 10 and 20 members,
most groups show a tendency to maintain smaller group sizes. The average SHG
size in the sample is 11.6 members (Table 1). 42% of groups maintained the min-
imum requirement of 10 members and 78% of groups had 12 or fewer members
(Fig 4.5.
Figure 4.4: Self-Help Group Formation Years
Group cohesion In around half the groups, members were very familiar with
one another at the time of the group formation. Based on qualitative information,
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Figure 4.5: Self-Help Group Size
most groups appeared to have favoured homogeneity within the group in terms
of location of residence, class, caste and occupation for the inclusion of members
to the group at the time of formation, although some of these criteria could have
been mandated by the Self-Help Promoting Institution. It is unclear how much
freedom was accorded in practice to members to choose other members to the
group. Outside of the group, members regularly worked together in 63% of SHGs,
interacted in family gatherings together in 59% of SHGs and interacted in village
gatherings in 49% of SHGs. 38% were involved in another SHG together.
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4.1.3 Agency
20% of groups had a member who ran for office in local government and 25% has
members who participated actively in public meetings. 25% has close kin who
had run for or held office in local government. There were at least 11 groups in
which women who had run for office came from families with no such history.
Again 25% of groups has at least one member who had been a government func-
tionary at the village level, such as a teacher or anganwadi worker, who would
have had knowledge of and access to a number of government welfare schemes
and programs for SHGs. 52% of groups had received some form of capacity build-
ing training either from their SHPI or another entity. This exposure allows groups
to be much more effective than they otherwise would be.
4.1.4 Goals and constraints
Group goals Members provided consensus information on their understanding of
the goals for their group. 75% of groups list income generation and economic
empowerment as SHG goals at the time of formation, with only 39% citing finan-
cial access (to credit or other financial products) as a goal for the SHG indicating
that both among SHPIs and group members, financial intermediation is generally
viewed as a means to economic independence rather than an end in itself. 40%
and 38% of groups cite social development and womens empowerment respec-
tively as their goals at formation, followed by political empowerment cited by
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23% of groups (Fig7). At the time of the survey however, around 22% of groups
had included social development as part of their agenda and cited it as now being
a part of their group goals. Similarly, 12% added womens empowerment to their
agenda since formation. Most groups believed that they shared their goals with
other SHGs in their village.
Group constraints The most common constraints cited by groups for not un-
dertaking further activity or for not being unable to accomplish their goals and
responsibilities was the lack of support from the promoting institution and the
lack of knowledge or skill to accomplish the task, cited by around half the groups.
Time constraint was cited by 36% of groups while member interest and coordina-
tion was cited by 32% as the reason the group could not perform better.
Descriptive statistics on indicators specifically shortlisted in the multidimen-
sional representation of SHG performance are listed below.
4.2 Internal: Cooperation Dimension
Various indicators of the group’s ability to “cooperate” in fulfilling their duties
and respnsibilities are assessed using indicators pertaining to member participa-
tion and administration.
Participation About a half of the groups report a high (¿80%) participation in
meetings and in activities and decision-making. Only 32% of groups have 80% or
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more members who are aware of group norms, rules and reglations.
Leadership All SHGs are mandated to have a President and a Secretary as exec-
utive members, while the post of Treasurer is required in certain cases only. Very
few SHGs (9%) conducted elections for executive posts and a majority instituted
leaders by selection. Once instituted, 60% of the groups did not change their lead-
ership, half of whom were 10 or more years old. 80% of groups had appointed a
Secretary and only 20% had a post of Treasurer at the time of the survey. Tasks ap-
peared to be equally distributed between President and Secretary in most groups
with a mean of 2.9 different responsibilities (from a pre set list of executive respon-
sibilities) carried out by the President and 2.4 by the Secretary, with the Treasure
carrying out less than 1 responsibility.
Fulfilment of administrative responsibilities 80% of SHGs generally collected
monthly savings and the rest in more frequent intervals, weekly or bi-weekly.
Although groups are typically required to receive savings contribution at groups
meetings, 27% of the groups had varying meeting and savings schedules. 52% of
the groups reported as having an attendance of 80% or above in their last 2 group
meetings and the common topics discussed ranged from financial and adminis-
trative responsibilities of the SHG to Government schemes and social activities
undertaken like Shakti Varta.
Government SHGs are required to maintain thorough documentation of their
activities, savings and credit in books such as the savings ledger, loan ledger,
cash book, minutes book and resolutions book. Whenever possible, surveyors
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requested permission from the group to check their documents and made note of
their maintenance. Only 26 groups maintained all 5 books without errors or miss-
ing information, and only 37% of groups that collected savings and disbursed
credit maintained the crucial savings and loan ledgers up to date. 77 and 80% of
the groups reported that members and the SHPI inspected these books periodi-
cally.
Fulfilment of financial responsibilities Except for 2 NGO promoted groups, all
other groups provided members with financial intermediation through savings.
70% of the groups additionally provided their members with access to credit.
Other financial services through the group such as insurance were uncommon.
The most popular savings cycle amounts were Rs. 100 (27% of groups) and Rs.
50 (42% of groups). SHG assets were mainly kept in the form of a savings ac-
count at a formal bank or as cash in hand. Very few groups held physical assets,
fixed deposits at bank or deposits with their SHPI. A majority of the groups (56%)
did not report any internal lending between members at the time of the survey
and 65% did not report any borrowing from external sources such as banks or
NGO-MFIs, although this is likely to be under-reported as we did not make an
attempt to verify this information. The average total group savings accumulated
at the bank was Rs. 35051.68 (or Rs. 31870 when eliminating a single outlier that
was around 10 standard deviations from the mean). This is comparable to esti-
mates of a NABARD study on groups in Orissa which estimated average savings
to be Rs. 39,951 (NABARD 2013-2014). Among those who had borrowed from
external sources, the mean loan size was Rs 93,967.55, higher than the NABARD
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estimate of Rs.89,522 for Orissa. The average size of an internal loan among those
who reported internal lending was Rs. 37501.59. Although susceptible to under-
reporting, 59 groups reported having at least one loan overdue to external sources
for 30 days or longer.
4.3 Internal: Coordination
The groups ability to “coordinate” to achieve outcomes such as undertaking activ-
ities and amicable resolution of conflicts to prevent dropouts is measured through
the following indicators.
Group activities Information on the activities other than financial intermedia-
tion undertaken by a group since its inception was recorded. Surveyors recorded
immediate reactions and]read out a list of potential private and public activities
SHGs in Odisha are engaged in ((cite)) and marked groups that had engaged in
the activity and also the primary entity that motivated the engagement. Based on
the nature of the public programs the activities fall under, they were classified as
income-generating and non-income generating activities. Income generating ac-
tivities included any entrepreneurial activity or marketing of produce, service pro-
vision to the Governments Public Distribution System, Integrated Child Devel-
opment Scheme or Mid-day-meal Scheme and contracting of public works such
as drinking water and sanitation facilities for which groups receive a commis-
sion. Non-income generating activities primarily included community support
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and awareness around good health, nutrition practices and education, against al-
coholism and domestic violence, and towards resolution of conflicts within the
village. It also included training and capacity building programs undertaken by
the group to improve their skills and functioning.
Groups undertook an average of only 2.4 income generating activities and
1.9 non-income generating activities in their lifetime. 15% of the sample did not
report undertaking any additional activities other than financial intermediation,
79% undertook at least 1 income generating activity and 76% undertook at least 1
non-income generating activities. Among income generating activities, the mostly
commonly reported was participation in the Total Sanitation Campaign (TSC)
(58% of groups) and the Integrated Child Development Scheme (56% of groups)
of the Indian Government and water supply initiatives of multiple implementers
(56% of groups). Despite being stated as a goal by many groups, only 46% had
been engaged in an entrepreneurial or marketing activity.
Among non-income generating activities, promotion of good health practices
was most common (60% of groups), perhaps as a result of the association of the
study with Shakti Varta. Around a third had engaged in resolving domestic vi-
olence issues, conflicts within the community and other social issues like alco-
holism. Only 20% had undergone training and capacity building programs con-
ducted by the SHPI or the Government through Block Federations.
30% of groups undertook any of the activities mentioned above out of their
own accord and 29% as a result of encouragement from the SHPI. In contrast,
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57% of groups had been prompted by village level frontline government workers,
especially the Anganwadi worker of the ICDS to participate in activities. 88% of
these groups were not formed under the ICDS and hence the Anganwadi worker
was not obliged to involve them as the SHPI. Compared to the 18% of total groups
not promoted by NGOs that were motivated by NGOs to undertake activity, the
involvement of the Anganwadi worker in SHG performance is high.
The distribution of the total number of activities undertaken is given in Fig 4.6.
Figure 4.6: Total No. of Activities undertaken (out of 12)
Conflict resolution Majority (58%) of groups had at least one dropout at some
point in their tenure. The average number of dropouts per group is 1.3. Larger
groups tended to have more dropouts with a statistically significant correlation
of 0.59, while age had a smaller but significant positive association of 0.2 with
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dropouts. The most common reason cited for dropping out was age and death
(in 41% of groups), followed by migration (20%), marriage (19%) and negative
attitude of household members (17%). In all, 22% of groups had a member leave
as a voluntary decision due to dissatisfaction with the group and access to credit
or to avail better programs and memberships.
4.4 External: General engagement
A few select indicators were chosen to represent the initiative undertaken by
SHGs to perform roles outside their mandate. These include measures used by
some SHG evaluations to assess performance such as awards received and grade
and other indicators such as involvement in reviving other SHGs, experience in
mobilizing community and participation in SHG Federations. 15% of groups had
received awards, 16% had reached out and garnered support within the commu-
nity for a common cause, 29% had helped revive other underperforming SHGs
and 18% were actively involved in Federation activities.
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CHAPTER 5
RESULTS
The empirical strategy detailed in section 3.2 is conducted on a subset of avail-
able indicators (refer Table 5.1) shortlisted based on theoretically and empirically
informed selection criteria.
Table 5.1: Shortlisted Variables and Dichotomous Forms
Indicators chosen Form of yi j Cutoff
z j
Criteria
ρ
INTERNAL
Awareness (cp1) Ordinal (3) 2 >
Participation (cp2) Ordinal (3) 2 >
Attendance (cp3) Ordinal (3) 2 >
Meeting Reg (cp4) Ordinal (4) 2 ≥
Documentation Reg (cp5) Binary 0 >
No overdue Loans (cp6) Discrete 1 <
Saving Reg (cp7) Ordinal (4) 2 ≥
Leader Rotation (cp8) Discrete 1 ≥
Member Doc Access (cp9) Binary 0 >
No. of Activities (cr1) Discrete µ(4.3) >
Self-Motivated (cr2) Discrete 1 ≥
Dropouts (cr3) Discrete 1 <
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Total Savings (cr4) Discrete µ(Rs.35052) >
EXTERNAL
Revived another SHG (ee1) Binary 0 >
Organized community around com-
mon issues (ee2)
Binary 0 >
Actively involved with SHG Federa-
tion (ee3)
Binary 0 >
5.1 Preliminary Reliability and Validity Results
Preliminary validity and reliability tests listed in table are conducted in order to
systematically assess the indicators included in the index.
5.1.1 Convergent Validity
Polychoric and polyserial correlations between shortlisted indicators in their orig-
inal forms are presented in Table C.1 (Appendix C). Relationships between most
indicators are positive in the direction of theory and hence consistent in their rep-
resentation of a single construct of ‘internal performance. The categorical variable
‘meeting regularity and continuous variable total savings displays negative cor-
relations with several variables owing to its highly skewed distribution. Overall,
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the Likelihood Ratio test of no correlation between variables is rejected at the 1%
level. Additionally, Kendall’s Tau-b coefficients are estimated with similar results
but slightly smaller magnitudes.
Tetrachoric correlations are estimated on the dichotomized version of the orig-
inal indicators. In this form, the indicator ‘rotation of leadership displays nega-
tive correlations with 6 out of 12 variables overall, and 3 out 6 variables within
the same ‘cooperation dimension. As a result, the indicator is dropped from the
index for exhibiting relationships inconsistent with theory either due to measure-
ment error or the presence of strong exogenous influence. The dichotomized rep-
resentation of total savings value continues to shows negative correlations with
5 out of 12 variables overall and 1 out of 3 in the ‘coordination dimension. It is
dropped from the index to be used for criterion analysis. The indicator ‘savings
regularity is also dropped from the index, in consideration of parsimony, due to
its strong positive correlation with ‘meeting regularity. Savings are typically col-
lected in meetings and hence both cycles are expected to be co-dependent on the
same exogenous factors. An additional concern regarding these two variables is
that the correlation between them may be positively influenced by self reporting
bias which implies that dropping one variable would work to increase overall re-
liability. This is not a concern held on the awareness, attendance and participation
variables at this stage because although they too are prone to measurement error,
it is less likely that the correlation between them is due to common exogenous
determinants.
69
Upon elimination of 3 variables from the convergent analysis, the index con-
sists of the 6 ‘cooperation variables, 3 ‘coordination variables and 3 ‘external en-
gagement variables to form the Theory Based Index I1 described in Table 5.2.
5.1.2 Construct Validity
Exploratory Factor Analysis The rotated loadings structure of the exploratory
factor analysis (EFA) based on polychoric correlations for Theory Based Index I1
are presented in Table C.2 (Appendix C). On analysis of all variables in the in-
dex, as hypothesised, 3 factors can be retained using the Guttman rule, i.e with
eigenvalue greater than 1 Guttman (1954). Factor 1 loadings are high in ‘aware-
ness(cp1), ‘attendance(cp2) and ‘participation(cp3) consistent with the hypothe-
sised ‘cooperation’ dimension. Factor 2 loadings are high in ‘self-motivated(cr2),
‘SHG engagement’(ee1) and ‘community engagement’(ee2). This bears strong
similarity the hypothesised ‘external engagement experience’ dimension except for
the inclusion of the ‘self motivated’ indicator. Loadings in the third factor are
high in ‘no overdue loans(cp6) and ‘no. of activities’(cr1) which could signify the
‘coordination’ dimension. Overall, the polychoric factor analysis reveals relation-
ships between variables representing the latent constructs identified as ‘coopera-
tion’ and ‘external engagement experience’. The third latent factor bears only a weak
semblance to the hypothesised ‘coordination’ dimension.
Based on the EFA, retained factors and the indicators that have a high loading
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(>0.5) on each of the factors, the Theory Based Index I1 is further streamlined to
form the EFA Based Index I2 described in Table 5.2.
Sensitivity to variable dichotomization In order to verify the results of the
EFA and to attempt an improvement, the dichotomization rules or z cutoffs are
revised for the shortlisted indicators in Theory Based Index I1. While all indicators
have a straightforward dichotomization, there is scope for better representation of
the variable ‘no. of activities’(cr1). The variable is based off a question to groups
on whether or not they have undertaken each of 12 prompted activities, aside from
savings and credit, since formation. The total number of activities undertaken
represents the original discrete form of the variable and the dichotomized form
identifies groups with “higher than average” number of activities undertaken.
Since the 33% of observation lie within 1 standard deviation around the mean, the
sensitivity to this cutoff is especially high (refer 4.6).
To avoid the misrepresentation by the dichotomizing on the basis of the mean
and to bring out the diversity in activities undertaken, two binary variables are
introduced in place of the variable ‘no. of activities’(c1), namely ‘entrepreneurial
activity’(cr4) and ‘public welfare activity’(cr5). ‘Entrepreneurial activity’(cr4) is a
binary variable derived from the same questions that ‘no. of activites’(cr1) is based
and indicates whether or not the SHG has undertaken an entrepreneurial income
generating small business or marketing activity. ‘Public welfare activity’(cr5) sim-
ilarly draws from the same underlying question and represents whether or not
the SHG has been involved in one of 6 different public welfare programs such
71
the Public Distribution System, ICDS, Mid Day Meal, drinking water provision,
Total Sanitation Campaign and the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan or education program.
Because of the fundamentally different skill set and incentive structure utilized
by these two different kinds of activities, it is believed that the two dichotomous
variables better represent the achievement of group objectives than a single di-
chotomous variable based on the total number of activities and a moment-based
dichotomization rule.
EFA is performed with the two new indicators ‘entrepreneurial activity’(cr4)
and ‘public welfare activity’(cr5) in place of ‘no. of activities’(c1) and the results
are detailed in Table C.3. As before, 3 factors are retained by the ‘Guttman’ rule.
The loadings around the first two factors remain the same and the two new indi-
cators along with ‘no overdue loans(cp6) shows similar loading weights for Factor
3 or the hypothesised ‘coordination’ dimension. The Likelihood Ratio chi-squared
coefficient improves as well. A third index utilizing this alternate definition of
the indicator ‘no. of activities’(cr1) is retained for further analysis and detailed as
Alternative z Index I3 as in Table 5.2.
5.2 Shortlisted Index Scores
A total of 3 Indices are shortlisted based on the prelimiary validity and reliability
tests. These are, the Theory Based Index I1 with a total of 12 indicators, the EFA
Based Index I2 and the Alternative z Index I3, each with a total of 9 indicators. The
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Table 5.2: Indices and Indicators
Theory-based Index I1 EFA-based IndexI2 Alternative z Index I3
1. Cooperation
Awareness (cp1) Awareness (cp1) Awareness (cp1)
Attendance (cp2) Attendance (cp2) Attendance (cp2)
Participation (cp3) Participation (cp3) Participation (cp3)
No Overdue Loan (cp6)
Meeting Reg (cp4)
Documentation Reg (cp5)
2. Coordination
No. of Activities (cr1) No Overdue Loan (cp6) No Overdue Loan (cp6)
Self-Motivated (cr2) No. of Activities (cr1) Entrepreneurial activity (cr6)
Dropouts (cr3) Public welfare activity (cr7) Public welfare activity (cr7)
3. Engagement Experience
SHG Engagement (ee1) Self-Motivated (cr2) Self-Motivated (cr2)
Community Engagement (ee2) SHG Engagement (ee1) SHG Engagement (ee1)
Fed Engagement (ee3) Community Engagement (ee2) Community Engagement (ee2)
12 Indicators (6 + 3 + 3) 9 Indicators (3 + 3 + 3) 9 Indicators (3 + 3 + 3)
indices and their component indicators are summarized in 5.2.
In order to choose the best of the 3 indices, further validity and reliability
tests are conducted based on the computed weighted index score. The score is
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weighted in a manner of Eqn 3.5 (Section 3.3.3) such that each of the dimensions
receives an equal one-third weight. In indices I2 and I3 where there are equal num-
ber of indicators within each dimension, each indicator carries equal weight. The
weighted score is scaled by 10 in order to give a comparable 0-10 score. Addition-
ally, the distribution of the index scores are presented as it is an indicator of the
discriminatory power.
5.3 Further Validity and Reliability Tests
5.3.1 Internal Consistency
The Kuder-Richardson (KR20) statistic measures the internal consistency of a test
and a particular form of the Cronbach’s Alpha suited for strictly dichotomous
tests. A higher KR20 statistic (ranging between 0 and 1) represents a higher de-
gree of reliability within indicators designed to measure a common characteristic,
although an exceptionally high statistic would indicate homogeneity. KR20 coef-
ficients for all shortlisted variables, each of the three indices identified in the em-
pirical process and the hypothesized dimensions within each presented in Table
C.5, along with their respective Item-Test correlations and average item difficulty.
A comparison of the KR20 values for the total indices indicates that reliability is
highest in the Alternative z Index I3. Comparing the dimension specific KR20 val-
ues across the indices also reveals that the dimensional consistency is highest for
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each of the 3 dimensions in the Alternative z Index I3.
For the purpose of demonstration, the Alternative z Index I3 is also presented
with 4 indicators in the ‘coordination’ dimension (including the additional indica-
tor ’documentation regularity’(cp5)) due to the relevancy of that indicator from
the EFA in C.3. However, the Alternative z Index I3 with 3 indicators in ‘coordi-
nation’ dimension (and 9 overall) is retained due to the higher KR20 within the
dimension and with consideration for parsimony, simplicity and symmetry in di-
mensions. Further tests are conducted on for this Index I3.
5.3.2 Discriminant Validity
Just as positive relationships are desired between indicators measuring a common
larger latent construct such as performance, or dimensions such as ‘cooperation
and ‘coordination, absence of strong correlations between dimensions is desired
in indices. Polychoric and Kendalls Tau coefficients between raw additive sums
of ‘cooperation, ‘coordination and ‘external engagement experience scores for the
Alternative z Index I3 are small in magnitude and are not statistically significant
(See Table C.4). This suggests that the hypothesised dimensions are disparate
and the multidimensional representation of performance as an index is helpful in
building a complete understanding of SHG efficiency.
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5.3.3 Criterion/Concurrent Validity
As another validity check, the association between the computed index score I3
(Alternative z Index) and several key variables concurrently measured in the sur-
vey are analysed for compliance with theoretical relationships. The appropriate
tests - Mann-Whitney on binary variables, Kruskal-Wallis for ordinal variables
and Spearman correlations for discrete and continuous variables are presented in
Tables C.6 and C.7 in Appendix C. While Table C.7 captures relationships with ex-
pected determinants, C.6 captures relationships with other concurrent variables
of interest.
The mean weighted total score is positively associated with most concurrent
variables. Member access to group documents, regularity of meetings are the
concurrent variables that hold significantly positive associations with the index,
while lack of member interest and coordination holds significantly negative asso-
ciations. Among potential determinants, education level of president is positively
related to total score while age of the group bears a significant negative correla-
tion.
5.3.4 Score Distribution
Basic descriptive statistics and distributions of the three shortlisted indicates I1, I2
and I3 are presented in Table 5.3. The Alternative z Index I3 also has the maximum
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Table 5.3: Comparison of the distribution of computed Indices
Index Measure N Mean Standard
Devia-
tion
Skewness Kurtosis Min Max
Theory Based Index I1 (0-10) 103 4.612 1.799 0.259 3.209 0.55 10
EFA-Based Index I2 (0-10) 147 4.452 2.255 0.107 2.456 0 10
Alternate z Index I3 (0-10) 147 4.648 2.141 0.055 2.365 0 10
I3 Dimension Scores
Cooperation (0-3) 147 1.286 1.128 .283 1.692 0 3
Coordination (0-3) 147 1.809 .939 -.261 2.111 0 3
External Engagement (0-3) 147 1.088 1.033 .420 1.923 0 3
range and the least standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis among the three.
5.4 Analysis of the Chosen Index
Based on the second round of reliability and validity tests on the three shortlisted
indicates I1, I2 and I3, I3 appears to perform best index. The chosen index and its
components are once again described in Table 5.2. The frequency distribution of
the total scores and the scores within each dimension are displayed in Figure 5.1
and tabulated in Table 5.4. Total score is fairly equally distributed between 0-10.
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Table 5.4: Frequency Table of I3 Score
Dimension No. Col%
Cooperation (0-3) 0 48 33
1 39 27
2 30 20
3 30 20
Coordination (0-3) 0 13 9
1 42 29
2 52 35
3 40 27
External Engagement (0-
3)
0 56 38
1 38 26
2 37 25
3 16 11
Total Score I3 (0-10) 0 1 1
1.11 14 10
2.22 15 10
3.33 26 18
4.44 26 18
5.55 24 16
6.66 24 16
7.77 13 9
8.88 2 1
10 2 1
Total 147 100
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Figure 5.1: Distribution of Dimension Scores and Total Scores of Index I3
5.4.1 Dimensional Non-Performance
The Alkire-Foster method adopted in the estimation of the Multi-dimensional
Poverty Index and the Women’s Empowerment in Agriculture Index involves a
dual cutoff method that not only identifies an index distribution but also the count
of groups that can be described as non-performers overall or within each partic-
ular dimension. Assuming the second cutoff z0 for each dimension to be 0, i.e
groups that have a score of 0 in a dimension are said to be “non-performers” or
“deprived” as used by Alkire and Foster (2011), we can identify deficient groups
in the manner of Eqn 3.7 (Section 3.3.3). Summary statistics for the binary ‘non-
performance’ indicator in each dimesion are expressed in Table 5.5.
Among a total of 147 groups for whom the index can be calculated, 38% are
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Table 5.5: Frequency Table of Dimensions of Non-performance
Dimension of Non-performance No. Col%
Cooperation 48 33
Coordination 13 9
External Engagement 56 38
Total No. of Dimensions of Non-performance No. Col%
0 60 41
1 58 39
2 28 19
3 1 1
Total 147 100
non-performers in the ‘external engagement experience’ dimension and 33% in
the ‘cooperation’ dimension. In comparison groups tend to perform much better
overall on the ‘coordination’ dimension.
In the scope of this study, the cutoff k for the total score in order nor a “head-
count” or overall-successful and unsuccessful SHGs has not been attempted due
to the lack of appropriate concurrent criteria to validate “headcount”. The study
focuses on the ordinal ranking of groups made possible by the total score I3 and
conducts further enquiry on the appropriateness and meaning and of this ranking.
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Nevertheless, using dimensional non-performance indicators enables evaluators
to supplement the information provided by the total index score by identifying
the specific areas for improvement.
5.5 Logistic Regression Analysis
Logistic regressions of total score and individual dimension scores on expected
determinants sheds further light on the validity of the chosen index I3. Draw-
ing from the criterion validity tests, ordered logistic regressions on hypothesized
determinants were carried out, and the results presented in Table 5.6. The basic
regression of weighted total scores on the set of institutional structure, composi-
tion and agency variables shows a significant positive relationship between the
score and education level of president, and a significant negative relationship be-
tween the score and age of the group. The overall model displays a moderately
good fit and a significant Likelihood Ratio. The proportionality of odds assump-
tion holds as well. This relationship with education level of president and age of
the group continues to hold when the ‘cooperation’ dimension alone is consid-
ered as the dependent. For the ‘coordination’ dimension, the score is positively
associated with SHG reporting political, social and women’s empowerment as
being among groups goals, while age of the group continues to hold a negative
relationship. For the ‘external engagement experience’ dimension, level of SHPI
monitoring and the presence of politically active members in the group display
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a significant positive relationship, while caste heterogeneity in the group (i.e the
SHG is not caste homogenous or has more than 1 caste) displays a significant neg-
ative relationship. The hypothesized determinants thus affect total and individual
dimension scores with varying relative magnitudes and significance.
Effect of education and age of the group
The significance of education level of president and age of the group in deter-
mining total weighted index I3 scores are further tested for robustness by mod-
ifying each of these variables in two ways. Table D.1 in Appendix D presents
ordered logistic regressions results of the total weighted score on the same set
of determinants, with education level and age of the group modified either by
dropping outliers (above 95th percentile) or by recoding to reduce the number of
categories. Education level is reduced from a 7 level scale to a 6 level scale in-
cluding the single outlier observation with tertiary education in the penultimate
cateogry of high school completion. Age is recoded from a discrete variable to a 4
level category ranging from ‘less than 5 years’ to ‘15-20 years’. Education level of
the president and age of the group continue to remain significant determinants of
total weighted score, although the level of significance reduces slightly
Alternate Dependent Variables
Further checks are conducted by transforming the dependent variable total
weighted score and using the ‘dimensional non-performance’ indicators from sec-
tion 5.2.1, the results of which are in Table D.2 (Appendix D). The total weighted
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Table 5.6: Ordered Logistic Regression of I3 Total Score and Dimensions
Total Score
(1)
Cooperation
(2)
Coordination
(3)
Ext Engagement
(4)
b/se b/se b/se b/se
NGO Involvement -0.065 -0.271 0.501 -0.205
-0.36 -0.38 -0.38 -0.39
Group size (No.) -0.019 -0.142 0.125 0.037
-0.07 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08
Group age (Yrs) -0.129** -0.122* -0.145** 0.006
-0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05
Caste heterogeneity present -0.375 0.393 -0.415 -0.950*
-0.35 -0.37 -0.36 -0.38
SHPI monitoring 0.263 0.095 -0.137 0.519**
-0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.19
Edu level of President 0.291* 0.393** -0.001 0.083
-0.12 -0.13 -0.12 -0.13
Members below 30 0.113 0.134 -0.226 0.441
-0.4 -0.43 -0.42 -0.43
Members politically active 0.635 -0.111 -0.291 1.670***
-0.37 -0.4 -0.4 -0.43
Members work together 0.678 0.171 0.355 0.7
-0.35 -0.36 -0.36 -0.37
SHG reports developmental goals 0.743 -0.265 1.498*** 0.563
-0.39 -0.41 -0.44 -0.43
N 119 119 119 119
R-sqr 0.059 0.083 0.079 0.119
D-Fre 10 10 10 10
Chi-sq 28.479 27.188 24.667 36.231
p-val 0.002 0.002 0.006 0
* p<0.05,
** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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score is recoded to form a 4 level categorical variable corresponding to its quar-
tiles, an the total number of dimensions (ranging from 0-3) of ‘non-performance’
is also included as a dependent variable aside from the binary ‘non-performance’
indicators for each dimension. In the ordered logistic regression of total weighted
score quartiles, the proportionality of odds assumptions continue to hold and
the education level of president and age of the group continue to hold signif-
icant relationships in the same directions as earlier regressions. For the ‘non-
performance’ indicators however, this significance no longer exists. The level
of SHPI monitoring and the presence of politically active members significantly
affects non-performance in the ‘external engagement experience’ dimension and
the total number of dimensions of ‘non-performance’. The regressions for non-
performance in the ‘cooperation’ and ‘coordination’ dimensions however are not
properly identified and do not show meaningful relationships with the same set
of determinants.
Alternate Independent Variables
Sensitivity to the variable definitions of the hypothesized determinants is
tested by attempting alternate representations of few indicators such as SHPI
monitoring, education level of president and the presence of members below the
age of 30 in the group (see Table D.3, Appendix D). The SHPI monitoring score,
which is a categorical additive score of binary indicators representing SHPI du-
ties (grading, inspection of books, motivation to perform activities and adequate
support and guidance) is replaced by a single binary indicator representing ‘ad-
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equate support and guidance provided’ as reported the SHG. Education level of
the president, a categorical variable is replace with the z score representing the
standardized average education level of the entire group. The binary variable
representing the presence of members below the age of 30 is replace with average
age of all members in the group. It is notable that education level of the president
as well as the standardised average education level of the group remains posi-
tively associated with total score under each of these circumstances, and age of
the group remains negatively associated with total score. The alternate forms of
SHPI monitoring and age of members do not display a significant relationship.
Relationship between dimensional non-performance and total score
Groups who have “not-performed” or earned a 0 in a dimension also tend
to have significantly lower total index scores. A logistic regression of non-
performance binaries on the total score also suggests a significant negative re-
lationship between total index score and dimensional non-performance with rel-
atively good fit. This suggests that there exists a consistent relationship between
non-performance in each dimension and the total index score, and information
from both can be used to better understand the nature and causes of SHG ineffi-
ciency.
In conclusion, the logical steps for test and index creation undertaken suggest
the best combination of indicators (given the theoretical framework considered
and available data) for the creation of the additive index. The computed weighted
index score I3 has admissible validity and reliability and displays meaningful re-
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Table 5.7: Relationships with concurrent variables
Dimension Non-
Performance
Mean
weighted
Total score
Measure of
association
Test Statistic
Cooperation No 5.272537 Mann-Whitney 6.052***
Yes 3.115469
Coordination No 4.903704 Mann-Whitney 5.360***
Yes 1.507937
External Engagement Experience No 5.469256 Mann-Whitney 6.990***
Yes 3.107345
Total No. of Non-Performing Dimensions 0 6.081872 Polyserial -.833***
1 3.948718 Correlation
2 1.904762
3 0
* p<0.05,
** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
lationships with other concurrent variables and determinants. The distribution
of scores also does not display an upward bias or left skewness unlike the some
SHG grading criteria Brett (2003). Using the Alkire-Foster dual cutoff framework
enables richer analysis into the specific dimensions of non-performance in order
to make more directed recommendations for the improvement of SHG-based in-
terventions.
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CHAPTER 6
DISCUSSION
Many studies on microfinance programs raise important questions on the hetero-
geneity of impacts caused by differences in group functioning, the sustainabil-
ity and evolution of groups and the characteristics that differentiate those that
are self-reliant and capable of being agents of social change (Bennett et al., 1996;
Deininger and Liu, 2009b; Chen et al., 2006). A first step in such an invesigation
would be the identification of performers or “good SHGs” and some measure of
the distance between performers and non-performers. This study presents a pre-
liminary attempt in that regard. By adopting the ‘membership-based organiza-
tions of the poor’ framework to understand the expectations placed on SHGs by
different stakeholders and characterizing SHG performance as being composed
of multiple dimensions, it presents an effort to formalize a standard metric of per-
formance for SHGs. A review of literature suggests the incorporation of 4 dimen-
sions of performance that can broadly be grouped under ‘internal’ and ‘external’
responsibilities of the group. The dimensions include ‘cooperation’, ‘coordina-
tion’, ‘general engagement experience’ and ‘program specific experience’. The
study uses data from 170 SHGs in Odisha, India to test the relevancy of hypothe-
sised indicators through the use of routine validity and reliability checks used in
psychometrics.
The methodology followed draws from psyhcometric theory and index-
creation literature to develop a theoretical foundation and nomological network
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for the selection of appropriate indicators of SHG performance. The study iden-
tifies three potential indices and shortlists the best weighted index score (repre-
sented in the study as I3) based on traditional reliability and validity tests that
can be conducted on given data. The weighted index I3 displays meaningful re-
lationships with a number of concurrently measured performance variables and
determinants. The index score can be further broken down into binary indicators
of non-performance within each dimension in the manner of Alkire and Foster
(2011). This yields rich information on the sources of inefficiency in SHGs.
6.1 Index Implementation
The index has been developed with the focus on ease of implementation. The anal-
ysis is conducted at the group level, the level at which SHPIs and development
practitioners typically conduct regular monitoring and evaluation. The indica-
tors forming the index are based on existing evaluation tools commonly used in
practice and in research study, thereby allowing for the possibility of computing
the index from prior data or with minimal modification to existing practices. The
index relies as much as possible on objective data and reducing self-report bias.
The applicability of a theoretically sound and empirically informed general
index such as I3 is wide. For example, it may be used in supplementing impact
evaluations of SHGs with an understanding of the efficiency of groups involved,
for SHPIs and policymakers who are interested in identifying strategies to im-
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prove the efficiency of SHGs, in programs that are interested in identifying and
involving the most efficient SHGs in program implementation, among other uses.
Preliminary regression analysis undertaken in section 5.5 provides an example
of analysis procedures that can be used to determine future courses of action for
implementors and inform policy. In the study sample, education level of the pres-
ident of the group was found to be a strong positive influence on the group score.
At the same time, age of the group was found to be significantly negatively asso-
ciated with score, suggesting that, at least in the sample analyzed, older groups
have tended to be less effective. In this sample, there appears to be no signifi-
cant difference in the performance of government and NGO promoted groups.
Further, determinants of individual dimension scores (in Table D.3), such as SHPI
monitoring can help implementors address non-performance in specific dimen-
sions.
6.2 Scope for further study
The scope of the study is limited by data availability and is constrained to pro-
viding a methodological background for further analysis. The simple additive
measure created needs to be further validated for concurrent and predictive va-
lidity through a comparison with other metrics of evaluation and expected fu-
ture outcomes. Importantly there is need to implement the tool along with other
shortlisted indicators in a specific context and Further reliability tests (such as
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test-retest and inter-rater tests) are warranted for assessing the reliability of self-
reported data from these groups and a larger sample size will add to the assess-
ment of scalability across contexts.
The multidimensional representation of SHG performance allows for the ad-
dition of a fourth ‘program experience’ dimension in the event that the index is
used within a specific program context or in order to test the suitability of an SHG
for inclusion into a program. Indicators that reveal SHG performance in a specific
area such as health or nutrition (as in the case of Shakti Varta) or in a particular
set of skills such as community mobilization or food preparation that are deemed
relevant within a context can be incorporated into the total score and an analyzed
in a similar manner. The validity of the index and its ability to meet the objectives
of implementation within a specific context needs to be tested.
The study in its current scope does not attempt to impute or adjust for missing
values in some or all of the indicators included in the index. As a result, index
scores are computed only for 147 out of 170 SHGs. In circumstances where miss-
ing values are unavoidable and dropping observations with one or more miss-
ing values is not an option, the advantage of techniques such as imputation and
matching percentiles (Foa and Tanner, 2012) can be explored.
Results from the logistic regression analysis suggest that further inquiry into
determinants of group performance (as measured by the suggested index) can
provide clarity on the effect of education level of the executive members and the
age of the group on performance. Replications of the study in different contexts
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can also enable an examination of the effect of the policy environment, incentive
structure, location and other exogenous factors determining SHG efficiency.
Importantly, the contribution of the index is in laying the framework for
an SHG evaluation tool that is informed by theory, determined by established
methodology and validated by primary data. The index afford comparability
across SHGs promoted by different SHPIs in different contexts and thus opens up
the possibility of effective consolidation of existing programs and groups, as is be-
ing attempted in countries like India through programs like ‘Shakti Varta’. Given
its multidimensional nature, the index developed in this study allows scope for
further validation, refinement and expansion to suit multiple needs.
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APPENDIX A
Descriptive Profile of Sample SHGs
Table A.1: Descriptive Profile of Sample SHG
2.1.1 Group Formation No. of SHGs % of SHGs
Governmental Promoters
Under Mission Shakti Program 64 38
Under ICDS 64 38
Other Govt Program 12 7
Non-Governmental Promoters
NGO 42 25
Mincrofinance Institution (MFI) 9 5
Members Involved in Formation 11 7
2.1.2 Member Demographics No. of Women % of Women
Age
Less than 19 yrs 6 0
20-29 yrs 287 15
30-39 yrs 605 33
40-49 yrs 607 33
50 yrs and above 350 19
Caste
SC 376 20
ST 809 44
OBC 608 33
General 55 3
Related to other members within group
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No 755 46
Yes 892 54
Education Level
None 879 49
Lower than 5th Std 445 25
5th-8th 202 11
8th passed 137 8
10th passed 85 5
12th passed 20 1
Graduate 14 1
Post-graduate 1 0
Other 4 0
Primary Income Source
Agriculture and allied activities 991 53
Wage labour 556 30
Self-employed 116 6
Forest produce 33 2
Salaried job 23 1
Pension 12 1
No source of income/Dependent 124 7
Other 5 0
2.1.3 Group Composition No. of SHGs % of SHGs
Caste Composition of group
Single Caste Group 105 61
Two Castes 49 28
Three or more Castes 18 10
Kinship within groups No. Col%
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No member is related to the other 42 28
At least 2 members are related to one another 108 72
2.1.4 Goals No. of SHGs % of SHGs
Group Goals at Formation
Financial Access 67 40
Entrepreneurial Income Generation 128 76
Economic Empowerment 126 75
Political Empowerment 39 23
Social Development 68 40
Women’s Empowerment 65 38
Current Group Goals
Financial Access 55 33
Entrepreneurial Income Generation 132 78
Economic Empowerment 98 58
Political Empowerment 38 22
Social Development 90 53
Women’s Empowerment 66 39
2.1.5 Lifespan and Size No. of SHGs % of SHGs
SHG Age
Less than 5 yrs 24 14
5-10 yrs 51 30
10-15 yrs 77 45
15-20 yrs 18 11
SHG has had at least one dropout
No 72 42
Yes 98 58
95
Reason cited for dropout
Migration 21 20
Marriage 20 19
Health 7 7
Age and Death 42 40
Discouragement from Household Members 18 17
Multiple Memberships 8 8
Not satisfied with group norms/procedure 11 11
Ineligibility and Default 11 11
Interested in availing other pro-poor benefits 1 1
Access to credit insufficient 2 2
Delays in receiving credit or bank linkage 3 3
2.1.6 Administration No. of SHGs % of SHGs
Appointment of Leadership
Selection by Consensus 154 91
Election 16 9
Rotation of Leadership
No change since formation 101 60
At least 1 change since formation 68 40
Savings Cycle
Weekly 16 10
Fortnightly 11 7
Monthly 135 81
Quarterly 4 2
Do not save 1 1
Meeting Cycle
Weekly 22 13
96
Fortnightly 24 14
Monthly 119 70
Quarterly 2 1
Do not save 3 2
Regularity of Savings Collection
Highly irregular 11 7
Irregular 28 17
Regular 115 69
Highly regular 13 8
Regularity of Meetings
Highly irregular 13 8
Irregular 33 20
Regular 110 65
Highly regular 13 8
Member attendance (% of total members) at meetings
Less than 80% attended last two meetings 76 48
80% or more attended last two meetings 81 52
Member awareness (% of total members) of group goals
50% or below 32 19
51-80% 79 47
81% and above 56 34
Member awareness (% of total members) of group norms
50% or below 41 24
51-80% 73 43
81% and above 55 33
Member participation (% of total members) in SHG decision-
making and activity
50% or below 30 18
97
51-80% 63 37
81% and above 76 45
No. of books maintained up-to-date
0 66 43
1 12 8
2 7 5
3 19 12
4 24 16
5 26 17
Access to books
Members inspect books periodically 128 77
SHPI inspects books periodically 131 79
2.1.7 Financial Discipline No. of SHGs % of SHGs
Financial Services Provided
Savings 167 99
Credit 116 71
Insurance 8 5
Other financial services 9 5
Savings Amount
Below rs. 50 40 24
Rs. 50 71 42
Rs.51 - Rs.99 4 2
Rs. 100 45 27
Above Rs.100 8 5
Group Assets
Groups with savings at bank 168 99
Groups with cash in hand 90 53
98
Groups with fixed deposit at bank 13 8
Groups with deposit at their SHPI 42 25
Groups with physical assets 8 5
Groups with loans circulated internally 74 44
Groups that have distributed refunds to members 23 14
Group Liabilities
Groups with loans received from bank 60 35
Loans overdue
More than 30 days 23 14
More than 60 days 49 29
More than 365 days 37 22
2.1.8 Activities No. of SHGs % of SHGs
Income Generating Activities
Entrepreneurial Small Business 66 40
Marketing of Produce 40 25
Public Distribution System 22 14
Mid Day Meal Scheme 41 25
ICDS or other Nutrition Program 81 50
Drinking Water Provision Program 81 50
Total Sanitation Campaign or other Sanitation Program 84 52
Non-Income Generating Activities
Campaign against Domestic Violence 49 30
Campaign against other social evils 47 30
Conflict Resolution and Problem Solving within Village 44 28
Health Promotion Program 87 54
Education Promotion Program 64 39
2.1.9 Initiative and Recognition No. of SHGs % of SHGs
99
Capacity-building
SHG has undergone a training or capacity building exercise 88 52
SHG has organized training for other groups or community 10 6
SHG Recognition
SHG has been graded 103 62
SHG has received awards 25 15
Has helped revive other groups 50 31
SHG has rallied community around common issues 82 49
Interaction with SHG Federation
SHG is aware of Federation 137 83
SHG is registered with Federation 69 50
SHG has received funds from Federation 61 44
SHG has received training from Federation 47 34
2.1.10 Constraints to SHG performance No. of SHGs % of SHGs
Member interest and coordination 45 32
Time and other obligations 50 36
Funding 13 9
Materials and other resources 22 16
Knowledge and skill 62 45
Lack of support from Govt or SHPI 69 50
Negative reaction from community 39 28
Negative reaction from family 32 23
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Table A.2: Descriptive Statistics of Key Indicators
2.1.5 Lifespan and Size No. of SHGs Mean Std. Dev Skewness
SHG Age 170 9.511765 3.946743 -.1308425
No. of Members 170 11.65294 2.14631 1.665447
No. of dropouts 170 1.323529 1.895504 2.687325
2.1.6 Administration
No. of duties overseen by President 170 2.882353 1.253745 .2952204
No. of duties overseen by Secretary 170 2.376471 1.156167 .2679891
No. of duties overseen by Treasurer 170 .4294118 .8959242 2.465706
2.1.7 Financial discipline
Value of Savings with Bank 168 35051.68 49107.13 7.739672
Value of Loans from Bank 67 84150.04 83525.7 1.732703
Savings Installment 168 67.52976 63.1342 5.433862
2.1.8 Activities
No. of income-generating activities undertaken 170 2.441176 1.94284 .3270244
No. of non-income-generating activities undertaken 170 1.882353 1.620225 .6765233
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APPENDIX B
Theoretical Background for Shortlisted Multidimensional Indicators
Table B.1: Dimenions, Indicators and References
Dimension Theoretical
Reference
Indicators shortlisted Indicator reference
INTERNAL Roever (2006)
1. Cooperation Calvert (1995)
Baland and Platteau
(1996), Grootaert and
Narayan (2000),
• Members are aware of
group norms
World Bank, CRI, Corp
Bank, Holy Cross
Wade (1988),
Crowley et al (2006)
• Members participate
actively in SHG
decision-making and
activities
World Bank, CRI, BASIX,
Corp Bank, Holy Cross,
Chaitanya
• Attendance in the last two
meetings
NABARD, CRI, MYRADA,
BASIX, Corp Bank, Holy
Cross, Chaitanya, CARE and
DRDA, Sa-Dhan
• Members meet on a
regular basis
Feigenberg et al (2014),
World Bank, NABARD,
MYRADA, Enable (2012),
BASIX, Holy Cross, DRDA,
Sa-Dhan
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Table B.1: Dimenions, Indicators and References
Dimension Theoretical
Reference
Indicators shortlisted Indicator reference
• Documentation
maintained up to date
CRI, MYRADA, BASIX,
Corp Bank, Holy Cross,
Chaitanya, CARE, DRDA,
Sa-Dhan
• Has not defaulted on
loans
Parida and Sinha (2010),
NABARD, CRI, MYRADA,
Enable (2012), BASIX,
Chaitanya, Sa-Dhan
• Members save on a
regular basis
World Bank, CRI, MYRADA,
BASIX, Corp Bank, Holy
Cross, Chaitanya, CARE,
DRDA, Sa-Dhan
• Leadership change since
formation
NABARD, CRI, MYRADA,
Enable (2012), BASIX,
Sa-Dhan
• Members access SHG
documents for use or
verification
BASIX, CARE
2. Coordination Calvert (1995)
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Table B.1: Dimenions, Indicators and References
Dimension Theoretical
Reference
Indicators shortlisted Indicator reference
Baland and Platteau
(1996), Wade (1988)
Grootaert and
Narayan (2000)
Manfred and
• Activities undertaken CRI, MYRADA, BASIX,
Corp Bank, Holy Cross,
Chaitanya, CARE, DRDA,
Sa-Dhan
Zeller (1997),
Agarwal and Goyal
(2001), Walker and
McCarthy (2006)
• Motivated to undertake
activity on own accord
Enable (2012)
• Dropouts from the group NABARD
• Total value of group
savings
Parida and Sinha (2010),
CRI, Enable (2012), BASIX,
Corp Bank, Holy Cross,
Chaitanya, CARE
EXTERNAL Roever (2006)
1. Engagement
Experience
Baland and Platteau
(1996)
• Revived another SHG Enable (2012)
• Organized community
around common issues
Enable (2012), BASIX, Holy
Cross
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Table B.1: Dimenions, Indicators and References
Dimension Theoretical
Reference
Indicators shortlisted Indicator reference
• Actively involved with
SHG Federation
Parida and Sinha (2010),
CRI, MYRADA, Sa-Dhan
2. Program Specific
Experience
Not considered for this study
DETERMINANTS
1. Institutional
structure
Baland and Platteau
(1996), Ostrom (1990)
• Self Help Promoting
Insitution (SHPI)
• SHPI incentivizes group Deininger and Liu (2009)
2. Cohesion Baland and Platteau
(1996), Wade (1988),
• Age of group BASIX, DRDA
Grootaert and
Narayan (2000),
Manfred and Zeller
(1997),
• Caste heterogeneity World Bank, NABARD, CRI,
BASIX, Holy Cross, DRDA
Agarwal and Goyal
(2001), Walker and
McCarthy (2006) and
others
• Members work together
outside of the SHG
• Group size NABARD, BASIX, Corp
Bank
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Table B.1: Dimenions, Indicators and References
Dimension Theoretical
Reference
Indicators shortlisted Indicator reference
3. Agency Baland, Somanathan
and Vandewalle
(2007)
• Members are politically
active
Enable (2012)
• Mean education level of
members
BASIX, Holy Cross, DRDA
• Members have undergone
training
Kaboski and Townsend
(2005), MYRADA, Chaitanya
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Table C.2: Factor Loadings for Exploratory Factor Analysis with all shortlisted
indicators
Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Uniqueness
Awareness (cp1) 0.8796 -0.1442 0.0684 0.2008
Attendance (cp2) 0.7261 -0.0279 0.2707 0.3987
Participation (cp3) 0.8442 0.0718 -0.1505 0.2595
No Overdue Loan (cp6) 0.1338 -0.0864 0.7706 0.3809
Meeting Reg (cp4) 0.2857 0.3316 0.2085 0.7650
Documentation Reg (cp5) 0.1890 0.0198 0.3502 0.8413
No. of Activities (cr1) -0.2452 0.4437 0.5445 0.4465
Self-Motivated (cr2) 0.0760 0.6850 0.1057 0.5138
Dropouts (cr3) 0.0210 -0.1862 0.2141 0.9191
SHG Engagement (ee1) 0.1355 0.5894 -0.2663 0.5633
Community Engagement (ee2) -0.2097 0.7848 -0.0126 0.3400
Fed Engagement (ee3) -0.0903 0.2663 -0.1960 0.8825
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Table C.3: Factor Loadings for Exploratory Factor Analysis with alternate activity
indicator
Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Uniqueness
Awareness (cp1) 0.8957 -0.1046 0.1061 0.1756
Attendance (cp2) 0.7211 -0.0369 0.2640 0.4089
Participation (cp3) 0.8788 0.0965 -0.1860 0.1839
No Overdue Loan (cp6) 0.1404 -0.1325 0.7293 0.4309
Meeting Reg (cp4) 0.2781 0.3971 0.3038 0.6727
Documentation Reg (cp5) 0.1475 0.0255 0.5305 0.6961
Entrepreneurial activity (cr4) -0.2708 0.1948 0.4629 0.6744
Public welfare activity (cr5) -0.1999 0.3830 0.5326 0.5296
Self-Motivated (cr2) 0.0706 0.7723 0.0941 0.3897
Dropouts (cr3) 0.0692 -0.2391 0.0709 0.9330
SHG Engagement (ee1) 0.0998 0.5941 -0.2128 0.5918
Community Engagement (ee2) -0.2218 0.7031 -0.0191 0.4561
Fed Engagement (ee3) -0.1158 0.2986 -0.1815 0.8645
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Table C.4: Polychoric (bottom triangle) and Kendall’s Tau-b (top triangle) corre-
lations between dimension scores
Cooperation
Score
Coordination
Score
Gen
Engagement
Exp Score
Cooperation Score 1 0.026 -0.021
Coordination Score 0.071 1 0.0235
Gen Engagement Exp Score -0.027 0.034 1
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Table C.5: Comparison of Kuder-Richardson Formula 20 for computed indices
Dimension/Indicators KR-20 Item-test
correlation
Average
item diffi-
culty
All shortlisted variables
Cooperation Indicators (6) 0.5568 0.2558 0.5589
Coordination Indicators (3) 0.1576 0.0754 0.3873
Gen Engagement Exp Indicators (3) 0.3455 0.1947 0.2828
I1 : Theory-based Index
Cooperation Indicators (6) 0.5503 0.2911 0.5266
Coordination Indicators (3) 0.2392 0.1295 0.3801
Gen Engagement Exp Indicators 0.3455 0.1947 0.2828
All indicators in I1 0.3963 0.1382 0.4466
I2 : EFA-based Index
Cooperation Indicators (6) 0.6610 0.4667 0.4331
Coordination Indicators (3) 0.2965 0.1664 0.5335
Gen Engagement Exp Indicators 0.5415 0.3491 0.3683
All indicators in I2 0.5027 0.2281 0.4328
I3 : Alternate z Index
Cooperation Indicators (3) 0.6610 0.4667 0.4331
Coordination Indicators (4) 0.3592 0.1862 0.6034
Gen Engagement Exp Indicators (3) 0.5415 0.3491 0.3683
All indicators 0.5215 0.2175 0.4762
Cooperation Indicators (3) 0.6610 0.4667 0.4331
112
Coordination Indicators (3) 0.3057 0.1657 0.6057
Gen Engagement Exp Indicators (3) 0.5415 0.3491 0.3683
All indicators in I3 0.5009 0.2159 0.4649
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Table D.1: Ordered Logistic Regression of I3 Total Score - Robustness checks for Edu and Age
Edu Recode
(1)
Edu Drop
(2)
Age Recode
(3)
Age Drop
(4)
b/se b/se b/se b/se
NGO Involvement -0.058 -0.099 -0.027 -0.067
-0.36 -0.36 -0.36 -0.36
Group size (No.) -0.02 -0.023 -0.012 -0.021
-0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07
Group age (Yrs) -0.130** -0.129** -0.530* -0.124*
-0.05 -0.05 -0.21 -0.05
Caste heterogeneity present -0.374 -0.343 -0.357 -0.361
-0.35 -0.35 -0.35 -0.35
SHPI monitoring 0.262 0.219 0.279 0.26
-0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18
Edu level of President 0.280* 0.240* 0.302* 0.289*
-0.12 -0.12 -0.12 -0.12
Members below 30 0.113 0.091 0.118 0.113
-0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
Members politically active 0.64 0.581 0.637 0.63
-0.37 -0.37 -0.37 -0.37
Members work together 0.678 0.641 0.659 0.677
-0.35 -0.35 -0.35 -0.35
SHG reports developmental goals 0.747 0.736 0.678 0.737
-0.39 -0.39 -0.39 -0.39
N 119 118 119 117
R-sqr 0.058 0.051 0.055 0.056
D-Fre 10 10 10 10
Chi-sq 27.991 24.072 26.779 26.714
p-val 0.002 0.007 0.003 0.003
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table D.2: Logistic and Ordered Logistic Regression of Multiple Forms of Dependent Variable I3
Quartiles
(1)
Total Non-
Perf Dimen-
sions
(2)
Cooperation
Non-Perf
(3)
Coordination
Non-Perf
(4)
Ext En-
gagement
Non-perf
(4)
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
NGO Involvement 0.484 -0.103 0.111 -0.999 0.055
-0.41 -0.4 -0.47 -0.94 -0.45
Group size (No.) 0.035 0.131 0.134 -0.02 0.058
-0.09 -0.08 -0.09 -0.16 -0.1
Group age (Yrs) -0.138* 0.095 0.081 0.241 0.015
-0.05 -0.05 -0.06 -0.13 -0.06
Caste heterogeneity present -0.418 0.605 -0.165 2.273* 0.713
-0.4 -0.38 -0.46 -0.93 -0.43
SHPI monitoring 0.381 -0.426* -0.212 0.03 -0.546*
-0.21 -0.21 -0.23 -0.43 -0.24
Edu level of President 0.363** -0.166 -0.327 -0.438 0.096
-0.14 -0.14 -0.17 -0.34 -0.15
Members below 30 0.308 -0.568 -0.686 0.336 -0.43
-0.47 -0.44 -0.51 -0.97 -0.5
Members politically active 0.308 -1.088* -0.108 -2.22 -1.758**
-0.44 -0.44 -0.51 -1.5 -0.56
Members work together 0.332 -0.624 -0.267 -0.025 -0.701
-0.4 -0.38 -0.44 -0.8 -0.43
SHG reports developmental goals 0.954 -0.522 0.248 -2.643** -0.423
-0.49 -0.43 -0.54 -0.94 -0.49
N 119 119 119 119 119
R-sqr 0.116 0.102 0.096 0.341 0.143
D-Fre 10 10 10 10 10
Chi-sq 27.383 26.607 13.831 25.044 22.915
p-val 0.002 0.003 0.181 0.005 0.011
* p<0.05,
** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table D.3: Ordered Logistic Regression of I3 Total Score - Sensitivity to Independent Variable def-
initions
SHPI Mon replaced
(1)
Edu replaced
(2)
Mem bel 30 Replaced
(3)
b/se b/se b/se
NGO Involvement -0.065 0.121 -0.014
-0.41 -0.34 -0.36
Group size (No.) -0.025 -0.006 -0.029
-0.08 -0.07 -0.08
Group age (Yrs) -0.137* -0.110* -0.153**
-0.06 -0.04 -0.05
Caste heterogeneity present -0.46 -0.353 -0.404
-0.4 -0.33 -0.35
SHPI monitoring -0.348 0.233 0.207
-0.39 -0.17 -0.18
Edu level of President 0.266 0.508** 0.302*
-0.15 -0.19 -0.13
Members below 30 0.038 0.084 0.035
-0.45 -0.36 -0.03
Members politically active 0.814 0.511 0.682
-0.42 -0.35 -0.37
Members work together 0.973* 0.661* 0.648
-0.4 -0.33 -0.35
SHG reports developmental goals 0.577 0.768* 0.722
-0.52 -0.39 -0.4
N 93 129 116
R-sqr 0.07 0.058 0.059
D-Fre 10 10 10
Chi-sq 26.335 30.045 28.114
p-val 0.003 0.001 0.002
* p<0.05,
** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table D.4: Logistic Regression of Non-Performance on Total Score
Cooperation Non-
Performance (1)
Coordination Non-
Performance (2)
External Engage-
ment Experience
Non-Performance
(3)
b/se b/se b/se
Total Score I3 -0.622*** -1.466*** -0.751***
-0.12 -0.35 -0.13
Constant 1.849*** 1.785* 2.628***
-0.49 -0.76 -0.54
N 157 164 162
R-sqr 0.205 0.461 0.264
D-Fre 1 1 1
Chi-sq 40.616 44.087 56.056
p-val 0 0 0
* p<0.05,
** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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APPENDIX E
Survey Tool Used in Study CONSENT FORM: (PLEASE READ ALOUD) We are staff of Shakti
Varta program and we are conducting a survey of Self Help Groups in collaboration with TCi-
Cornell University, USA for an independent research study. We would like to interview at least
3 members of your group including your President or other Executive Member. The survey will
take approximately 45 minutes. Your name and contact number will be recorded at the end of the
interview in order for us to contact you in case of questions. All personal names, SHG name and
details shall be kept confidential and will not be used to identify you. The survey is voluntary
and you may choose to not answer or stop the survey at any point. You can contact Samyuktha
Kannan, Cornell University (9841816131) in case of any questions or issues relating to the survey.
Do you consent to participate in the survey?
1. GROUP CONSTITUTION
1.1 Month and Year of formation of SHG:
1.2 No. of months of operation completed since formation of SHG:
1.3 Who formed the SHG? Mission Shakti-1, AWW/ICDS-2, NGO-3, MFI-4, Members-5, Other
1.4 Write the goal / objectives of SHG (refer the Resolution Book or else ask and write the same)
1.5 No. of members in the SHG at formation:
1.6 No of members in the SHG currently:
1.7 Members details
1.8 Roles and Responsibilities of President, Secretary and Treasurer
1.9 Member inclusion criteria
1.10 Total number of dropouts since inception:
1.11 Reasons cited for dropout:
Migration-1, Marriage-2, Health Reasons-3, Age and death-4, Negative attitude of HH Member-
5, Multiple memberships-6, Group norms and procedures-7, Ineligible-8, To avail other pro-poor
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benefits 9, Small volume of loans 10, Delay in getting bank linkage 11, Other
1.12 Number of times change in leadership since inception:
1.13 How well did you know group members at the time of formation?
Not at all familiar -1, Slightly familiar-2, Moderately familiar-3, Very familiar-4, Extremely
familiar-5
1.14 How well do you know group members now?
Not at all familiar -1, Slightly familiar-2, Moderately familiar-3, Very familiar-4, Extremely
familiar-5
1.15 What are some of the ways you regularly interact with group members outside of the SHG?
Involved in another SHG together-1, Involved in work/income generating activity together-2,
informally in neighbourhood -3, family gatherings-4, village gatherings-5, at school/awc/ration
shop-6, Other
2. ORGANISATIONAL DISCIPLINE AND SYSTEMS
2.1 Does the SHG have operational norms / resolutions to manage the day to day activities?
Yes-1, No-2
2.2 Percentage of members have clarity on the goals and objectives of SHG: 50% or Below-1, 51 to
80%-2, 81% or Above-3
2.3 Percentage of members are aware of the key norms / guidelines of SHG: 50% or Below-1, 51 to
80%-2, 81% or Above-3
2.4 Percentage of members are actively involved in the activities of SHG: 50% or Below-1, 51 to
80%-2, 81% or Above-3
2.5 Does the SHG conduct group meetings?
Yes-1, No-2
2.6 Frequency of group meeting: Weekly-1, Forthnightly-2, Monthly-3, Quarterly-4, Half yearly-5,
Annually-6, Not met at all-7
2.7 Regularity of meeting:
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Highly irregular-1, Irregular-2, Regular-3, Highly Regular-4
2.8 Percentage of attendance in the last two meetings:
50% or Below-1, 51 to 80%-2, 81% or Above-3
2.9 Key points discussed in the last two meetings:
2.10 Does the SHG collect savings?
Yes-1, No-2
2.11 Frequency of savings: Weekly-1, Forthnightly-2, Monthly-3, Quarterly-4, Half yearly-5,
Annually-6, Not met at all-7
2.12 Regularity of savings: Highly irregular-1, Irregular-2, Regular-3, Highly Regular-4
2.13 Average amount of savings per member per cycle:
2.14 Book Keeping / Documentation by SHG
Sl. No., Record, Record Maintained (Yes-1, No-2), Updated-1, Not Updated-2, Error and Missing
Information (Yes-1, No-2), Person in-charge (Pres-1, Secy-2, Treasurer-3, Other-4)
1 Minutes Book
2 Resolution Book
3 Savings Ledger
4 Loan Ledger/Register
5 Cash Book
6 Other
2.15 Do other members access/inspect books?
Yes-1, No-2
2.16 Do other organizations SHPI or Govt worker access books?
Yes-1, No-2
2.17 Has the SHG ever been graded on quality parameters?
Yes-1, No-2
2.18 Organization and grade received
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3. FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND PERFORMANCE
3.1 Type of financial services provided by the SHG:
Savings-1, Loan-2, Insurance-3, Any Other
3.2 Assets and Liabilities with the SHG:
3.3 Portfolio at risk: (due but not yet paid)
3.4 Source of other funds generated by SHG:
4. GOALS AND OBJECTIVES
4.1 With what goals did you start out as a SHG?
Financial services-1, Business/income generation-2, Economic empowerment-3, Political
empowerment-4 Social development-5, Womens empowerment-6, Other-7
4.2 What are your current goals as an SHG?
Financial services-1, Business/income generation-2, Economic empowerment-3, Political
empowerment-4, Social development-5, Womens empowerment-6, Other-7
4.3 What are individual member goals from being a part of an SHG?
Financial services-1, Business/income generation-2, Economic empowerment-3, Political
empowerment-4, Social development-5, Womens empowerment-6, Other-7
4.4 Do you share common interests with other SHGs in your village?
Yes-1, No-2
If the answer to Q 4.4 is Yes, what are these interests?
5. TRAINING AND CAPACITY
5.1 Has the members of SHG undergone any training?
Yes-1, No-2
5.2 If answer to Q. No. 5.1 is Yes, give details about the training attended:
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5.3 Number of women from SHG who ran for office/been elected to a Panchayati Raj Institution
(Sarpanch/Village Council etc)
5.4 Number of women from SHG who have close family (same Household) who ran for of-
fice/been elected to a Panchayati Raj Institution (Sarpanch/Village Council/Ward Member etc)
5.5 Number of women from SHG who actively participate in Panchayat (attend and make sugges-
tions etc)
5.6 Number of women from SHG who CURRENTLY ARE OR HAVE BEEN been Govt School
Teacher/AWW/ANM/ASHA
6. SOCIAL ACTIVITIES AND SERVICES
6.1 Type of other activities undertaken by SHG:
Undertaken Yes-1, No-2,
Who motivated? SHPI(Self Help Promoting Institution)-1, ANM/AWW/ASHA-2, Mission Shakti
Officer-3, Government Department-4, NGO-5, PRI-6, Own Self-7, Other SHGs-8, Other -9
1) Training / Capacity Building
2) Health promotion
3) Income generation
4) Nutrition / ICDS
5) Public Distribution System
6) Drinking Water
7) Marketing
8) Sanitation
9) Addressing Domestic Violence
10) Education
11) Conflict resolution and problem solving
12) Mid-day Meal
13) Addressing other social issues (alcoholism, child labour, gender sensitization)
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14) Other
6.2 Has the SHG organized any training program?
Yes-1, No-2
If answer to Q. No. 6.2 is Yes, give details about any training program organized by the SHG:
6.3 Has the SHG received any award or recognition?
Yes-1, No-2
If answer to Q. No. 6.3 is Yes, specify the award or recognition received by the SHG:
6.4 Is the SHG directly involved or it has any prior experience in community organization?
Yes-1, No-2
If the answer to 6.4 is Yes, give details about the role played by the SHG:
6.5 Has the SHG been involved in setting up of new SHGs or reviving disfunct groups?
6.6 Linkage of SHG with various development programs / schemes (BOTH GOVT AND NGO)
6.7 Are you aware of the SHG Federation in your GP or Block?
Yes-1, No-2
6.8 If the answer to 6.7 is Yes, what has been your interaction with the Federation?
7. CHANGES SINCE BECOMING AN ACTIVE SHG MEMBER
7.1 At the SHG Level:
7.2 At the Village Level:
7.3 At the Household Level:
7.4 At a personal level:
8. GENERAL FEEDBACK
8.1 What are constraints of the SHG in undertaking further social activities and community
128
mobilization?
Money-1, Time/other obligations-2, Materials and other resources-3, Knowledge and Skills-4,
Lack of support from Govt/Institutions-5, Negative reaction from Community-6, Negative reac-
tion from household members-7, Lack of coordination/interest among members-8, Other
8.2 What can SHG Federation do to remove these constraints?
8.3 What are the SHGs future priorities
9. PERTAINING TO SHAKTI VARTA - Not conducted on full sample
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